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Abstract 
 
A wide-body of empirical and experimental research on recognising 
and explaining the behaviour of household energy bill payers suggests 
that household energy bill payers do not always abide by the 
postulation of having unchanging preferences. The particular research 
explored in this dissertation suggests that social preferences support 
rational choice theory, create reductions in household energy 
consumption, and encourage the purchase of carbon labelled 
products.  
 
For an explanation for why this decrease in energy consumption 
occurs, this thesis takes the stance that preferences are malleable and 
context-dependent and, at times, endogenous. To broaden the 
research on endogenous preferences in the explanation of household 
energy bill payers related behaviour, I champion a social preference 
extension strategy that allows context-dependent preferences to 
complement the behaviour of household energy bill payers by 
attaching the social preference extension strategy to rational choice 
theory.  
 
The premise of having malleable preferences creates options where the 
policymakers rely on persuasion and context manipulation to change 
preference orderings as well as the tools of rational choice theory that 
advocates the preference for more over less with given preference.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
This dissertation explores the potential effects of context-dependent 
consumer preferences when these preferences are attached to the 
framework of rational choice theory. The economic principles of 
rational choice theory specify that consumer preferences are transitive 
and complete and follow the basic rational principle of wanting more 
over less. Context-dependent preferences occur when situational cues, 
'determine appropriate behaviour in any given setting' and 
furthermore, 'we evaluate outcomes from a particular point of view, 
namely, our current state or the state experienced by members of our 
reference group' (Bowles, 2004, p.97).  
 
Framed in the context of household electricity consumption and 
carbon footprint labels is textbook rational choice theory. The 
selection of these items is because individuals use electricity everyday 
in households across most of the world, and the same individuals 
purchase food everyday across most of the world. Given the 
magnitude of household electricity use, and the participation in the 
purchase of foodstuffs, savings in carbon related behaviour could have 
an impact on slowing down the progression of climate change.  
 
Climate change occurs due to the existence of greenhouse gases found 
in the atmosphere; an increase in greenhouse gases is increasing the 
average global temperature of the earth. The impacts of global 
warming may include a rise in sea levels, more severe tropical storms, 
crop failure and the disappearance of coral reefs (IPPC, 2011). 
Greenhouse gases accumulate in the atmosphere because, in part, 
our busy lives of coming and going are releasing more and more 
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. Anthropogenic (man-made) 
greenhouse gases include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
sulphur hexafluoride, hydrocarbons, and perfluorocarbons. The 
greenhouse effect is accelerated by anthropogenic interference from 
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people's dependency on fossil fuels such as coal, oil, and gas (IPCC, 
WGIII, 2011). The Summary for Policymakers (IPCC, WGIII, 2011, p.3) 
states that 'most of the observed increase in global average 
temperature since the mid-20th century is very likely1 due to the 
observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas concentrations'. 
 
Mitigating climate change is not one single country’s problem; it is an 
international problem, requiring cooperation between governments. 
The reason that no one single country is immune from climate change 
is because the air, which we breathe, has some unique characteristics 
that fall under the definition of public goods. Public goods are non-
rival and non-excludable. Non-rival means that one individual's 
consumption of the air does not stop other individuals breathing in 
the air. Non-excludable means no individual is excluded from using 
the air to breathe, despite whether that individual helps to pay to have 
fewer greenhouse gases present within the air or not. Given the very 
nature of the public good, it becomes increasingly easy for individuals 
to free ride on the public good, for the transaction costs of finding out 
whether individuals are 'doing their bit' becomes too high. Of all the 
greenhouse gases, carbon dioxide is perhaps one of the worst in terms 
of air pollution emissions. Approximately 84% of emissions were 
carbon dioxide in 2009 in the UK (DECC, 2011). 
 
This dissertation champions 4 research questions in the mitigation of 
climate change. Research questions 1 and 2 are the focus of Chapter 
2. These research questions test for whether consumers make choice 
predictions that are rational and obey transitivity. Chapter 3 deals 
with the 3rd research question by using consumer rationality to help 
form a social preference extension strategy based on these predictions 
of consumer rationality and the verification of transitivity. Chapter 4 
looks at the 4th research question by seeking ways to mitigate free 
riders from local communities through a Four-Grid Repetitive Game 
                                                 
1
 ‘very likely’ refers to a >90% assessed probability of occurrence. 
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Payoff Matrix (Chapter 4, Figure 4, p.73) that conforms to consumer 
rationality and transitivity. 
 
Chapter 2 and research questions 1 and 2 
Before remodelling (but not violating) the assumptions of rational 
choice theory with a social preference extension strategy, modelling 
commences to prove that household energy bill payers are rational 
and abide by the assumptions of rational choice theory. Chapter 2 
seeks to validate rational choice theory by searching for rationality in 
household energy bill payers' choices by measuring rationality against 
two variables. The first is the price of electricity; the second is 
information on electricity. The research questions (RQ) are: 
RQ1: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when faced with an increase in the price of household 
electricity? 
RQ2: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when exposed to information on energy consumption in the 
household? 
 
Research questions 1 and 2 strike at the very heart of rational choice 
theory, because these research questions aim to prove that more over 
less is preferred in the pursuit of utility maximisation. Research 
questions 1 and 2 fall under the main beliefs explained by 
Neoclassical Rational Choice Theory. Neoclassical Rational Choice 
Theory has its origins in the ideas of Smith (1776), Mill (1836), Knight 
(1921), Samuelson (1947) and Becker and Stigler (1977).  
 
Central to rational choice theory is economic man. Economic man is a 
man who is almost completely motivated by self-interest and the 
pursuit of utility-maximisation. Assumed in research questions 1 and 
2 of this dissertation is the belief that policymakers do not target 
household energy bill payers' individual preferences, because 
household energy bill payers always want 'the best deal' subject to 
price and income, and that this best deal is found by assuming that 
preferences are transitive and complete (Becker and Stigler, 1977). To 
declare that household energy bill payers want nothing over something 
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is to declare household energy bill payers irrational. Furthermore, 
policymakers assume this of all households in that preferences are 
individual but homogeneous (Veblen, 1919).  
 
Chapter 3 and research question 3 
The research then continues by looking at how rational choice theory 
has the opportunity to include social preferences in the manipulation 
of consumer choices over household energy consumption. Chapter 3 
provides the structure for this manipulation in the form of a social 
preference extension strategy that shall attach itself to rational choice 
theory. I define the social preference extension strategy as:  
The social preference extension strategy is an approach that uses peer 
pressure and social norms to make consumer choices context-
dependent on the choices of other consumers.  
 
If research questions 1 and 2 confirm rationality and transitivity in 
household energy bill payers' actions (ie want more over less), then 
research question 3 moves to suggest that this rationality not only 
influences quantitative axioms of rational preference (eg £10 is 
preferred to £5) but also qualitative axioms (eg social preference, like 
fairness is preferred to unfairness). To attach social preferences to 
rational choice theory requires introducing social man. Social man 
forms part of Social-Economic Man that describes how household 
energy bill payers make choices from two different premises. On the 
one premise, economic man is self-interested with individualistic 
preferences. On the other premise, social man is self-interested but 
with preferences that are context-dependent on other household 
energy bill payers' preferences (Duesenberry, 1949; Leibenstein, 1950; 
Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Loomes and Sudgen, 1982; Davis and 
Holt, 1993; Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998; Loomes, 1998, 1999; 
Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Bowles, 2004; Akerlof and Kranton, 2005).  
 
Chapter 2 investigates whether household energy bill payers have 
rational individualistic preferences. Chapter 3 investigates whether 
household energy bill payers have rational individualistic preferences 
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as well as rational context-dependent preferences, therefore, research 
question 3 asks: 
 RQ3: Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect 
 on household energy bill payers' electricity consumption? 
 
Research question 3 introduces social preferences into the model of 
rational choice theory for the purpose of manipulating household 
energy bill payers' choices in the understanding that household 
energy bill payers' preferences might be malleable and context-
dependent on the preferences of other household energy bill payers. 
 
The idea of incorporating social preferences into rational choice theory 
is not completely new. Many leading economists have extensively 
discussed how consumer preferences ought to be viewed as context-
dependent (cf Bowles, 2004; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and 
Rabin, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 1999; Falk and Fishbacher, 1998; 
Rabin, 1993). However, although the social preference extension 
strategy discussed in Chapter 3 takes and supports these views of 
other economists, it differs in the sense that household energy bill 
payers' choices are broken-down into their component parts detailing 
when social preferences become relevant and active. What is of 
fundamental critical importance is that the presence of the social 
preference extension strategy does not violate the laws governing 
rational action (Bowles, 2004) either when social preferences are used, 
or when social preferences are not used in the choice process. The 
social preference extension strategy is designed to extend and attach 
itself to the choice options of household energy bill payers, but the 
household energy bill payer remains rational in his or her choices. By 
using the social preference extension strategy, it does not mean that 
hundreds upon thousands of new and confusing variables have to be 
justified, interpreted, and defined into the choices of the household 
energy bill payer. The social preference extension strategy simply 
represents the times when the household energy bill payer has 
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preferences that are context-dependent on other household energy bill 
payers' preferences.  
 
Chapter 4 and research question 4 
Chapter 4 uses the social preference extension strategy and the 
rationale of context-dependent preferences to challenge the 
boundaries of rational choice theory, because consumer choices are 
context-dependent on the choices of other consumers. To engage how 
'context-dependency' affects consumer choices a Four-Grid Repetitive 
Game Payoff Matrix is constructed (Chapter 4, Figure 4, p.73). The 
Four-Grid Repetitive Game Payoff Matrix shows individuals following 
options to purchase or not to purchase products that have carbon 
footprint labels. The final research question is: 
 RQ4: Can a social preference extension strategy help to put off 
 free riders and maintain a Pareto-improvement in the purchase 
 of low carbon information footprint labelled products? 
 
The crux of research question 4 builds on the premises of all the other 
research questions before it. To prove research question 4 correct or 
incorrect requires a shift towards the use of social norms and peer 
pressure that promotes fairness and the desire to reciprocate that 
fairness (Guth et al., 1982 and Rabin 1993) within communities and 
not to free ride on others that is common practice when public goods 
are the target of concern. Research question 4 does this by seeking 
ways in which the Nash dominant equilibrium option does not 
automatically become the default option of choice (Nash, 1950). 
 
To help persuade consumers from defaulting to the dominant Nash 
equilibrium, Chapter 4 uses repetitive games and conditional 
cooperation. According to Chaudhuri (2007, p.5), ‘Conditional 
cooperation is defined as one whose contribution to the public good is 
positively correlated with his belief about the contributions to be made 
by other group members.’ Therefore, conditional cooperation activates 
mutual context-dependency when small local community groups work 
together and trust each other, but at the same time, have the power to 
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administer punishment to those in the group that do not conform 
(Alpizar, Carlsson and Johanssson-Stenman, 2008; Cialdini, 2003; 
Fischbacher, Gacther and Fehr, 2001; Frey and Meier, 2004; Shang 
and Croson, 2004).  
 
Community action is context-dependent because social norms and 
peer pressure both provide for the opportunity to use, to regulate, and 
if need be, to enforce cooperation on small local community groups 
(Cialdini, 2003; Goldstein, Cialdini and Griskevicius, 2008; Gerber 
and Rogers, 2009; Cialdini, Reno and Kallgren, 1990). From this 
context-dependency comes the desire, want, not to free ride on other 
group members' efforts. These conditions are what policymakers can 
use to help reinforce policy so that it is not simply price structured in 
that I argue that the social preference extension strategy only requires 
an initial incentive (eg environmental cause) for the community to 
respond into action, supported by social norms and peer pressure.  
Conclusion 
Chapter 1 has introduced the structure of this dissertation and its 
research questions. Research questions 1 and 2 form the bases on 
which rational choice theory resides by seeking to find out whether 
consumers do want more over less with given preferences. If 
consumers do want more over less, then the reality of wanting more 
over less is applied to context-dependent preferences. 
Research questions 3 and 4 both intend to investigate how context-
dependent preferences do, or do not, support rational choice theory by 
attaching the social preference extension strategy to rational choice 
theory.   
What follows in Chapter 2 is a look at whether household energy bill 
payers are rational, by finding out if household energy bill payers do 
seek more over less.  
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CHAPTER 2 
How Rational Choice Theory Explains Household Energy Bill 
Payers' Choices: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations into 
Household Energy Consumption Related Behaviour 
 
Introduction 
The most logical starting point in the remodelling of economic 
behaviour is to begin with what we know, and then elaborate on this 
knowledge. The 'what we know' relates to rational choice theory, 
perhaps the most recognised behavioural economic model in 
economics. Integral to rational choice theory is the assumption that 
individuals act rationally. Discussed later in Chapter 3 is the social 
preference extension strategy [that shall attach itself to rational choice 
theory] that assumes individuals act rationally. Rationality requires 
proving, therefore. This Chapter seeks to prove rationality by using 
the rational choice theory model of behaviour in relation to how 
household energy bill payers decrease household energy consumption 
when under the influence of household energy information and 
electricity prices. The research aim is, thus, to investigate to what 
extent the assumptions and components of rational choice theory may 
change household energy consumption, and if there is a case for 
change, then how effective are these assumptions and components in 
changing choices in relation to decreasing household electricity 
consumption? 
  
To support this Chapter's research aim, Chapter 2 uses research 
objectives (ie what is going to be done) and strategies (ie how it is 
going to be done). These objectives and strategies are devised so that 
answers are obtained for the first two research questions: 
 Q1: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when faced with an increase in the price of household 
electricity? 
 Q2: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when exposed to information on energy consumption in the 
household? 
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To answer research questions 1 and 2 (p.14), this Chapter begins with 
an explanation for what rational choice theory is (Becker. 1976). An 
understanding of rational choice theory is a prerequisite for the reader 
so that the reader can understand how research questions 1 and 2 
relate to rational choice theory, and later on in this dissertation, to the 
social preference extension strategy. From this premise, the 
assumptions and components of rational choice theory are set out at 
the beginning of this Chapter. 
 
From here, the research objectives take hold. The research objectives 
are set in place to test rational choice theory in relation to household 
energy bill payers' electricity consumption in the household. To test 
the hypothesis of rational choice theory, research strategies are set 
out to explain how the research questions are answered set around 
two models. The first model is Figure 1 (p.21) and explains how the 
household energy bill payer makes choices when exposed to an 
increase in the price of electricity supplied to the domestic home (cf 
Taylor, 1975; Maddala, 1997; Garcia-Cerratti, 2000; Espey and Espey, 
2004). The second model is Figure 2 (p.29), and explains how the 
household energy bill payer makes choices when exposed to 
information that relates to the electricity used in the household. 
 
Research question 1 relates to Figure 1 (p.21), and conforms to the 
conventional thinking that surrounds rational choice theory, namely 
prices, incomes, given preferences and perfect information. Figure 1 
(p.21) maps each stage of the household energy bill payer's choices. To 
test whether Figure 1 (p.21) supports or negates whether an increase 
in the price of household electricity leads to a decrease in electricity 
consumption, empirical evidence is discussed on what happens to 
electricity consumption when households are exposed to electricity 
price increases. Research question 2 relates to Figure 2 (p.29) and 
demonstrates how information has the potential to affect how much 
household energy is consumed in the household based on the flow of 
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information being disseminated to households. However, though the 
focus of the research is to seek responses from household energy bill 
payers' reactions to price increases. Households could maintain 
current household energy consumption and make changes outside the 
parameters of energy use. These changes could be, for example, to eat 
out fewer times per month, or visit fun-parks fewer times. In essence, 
the option to decrease or increase household energy has an associated 
monetary cost and this monetary cost could be found by substituting 
one activity for another activity. This substitution is dependent upon 
the cross-elasticity of demand of the household energy bill payer and 
its associated opportunity cost.   
To confirm the hypothesis of both research questions 1 and 2, the 
research should find that household energy bill payers do decrease 
household energy use when exposed to increases in the prices of 
electricity or are informed that their choices are inefficient in their 
control over electricity consumption in the household. The measure of 
validation is whether the empirical evidence complements Figures 1 
(p.21) and 2 (p.29) and the axioms of rationality, namely transitivity 
and completeness, indicating that household energy bill payers are 
rational when making household electricity consumption decisions by 
preferring more savings over less savings.  
 
Economic man 
John Stuart Mill (1836) first used the phrase ‘economic man’. Over the 
years, economic man's representation and interpretation has taken 
numerous different forms. Philosophers and others have been trying 
to explain how consumer choices are made for centuries. One of the 
first was Bernard Mandeville (1705) whom proclaimed that whole man 
has many personality layers that drive household consumers to 
maximise spending patterns. It is, however, Adam Smith's Wealth of 
Nations (1776) to whom the credit is often given for delivering 
economic man into the arena of economics.  
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According to Adam Smith, and taken in its most narrow market 
transaction interpretation, economic man is a man who is almost 
completely motivated by self-interest and the pursuit of utility-
maximisation. Set in the context of economics, utility is to mean the 
satisfaction elicited from an activity. Self-interest is to mean the 
pursuit of private interest. Private-interest is not the result of pure 
selfish behaviour insofar as private interest is to hanker after personal 
gain. Personal gain is to mean how man weighs up his costs and 
benefits which are derived from making choices, but these choices rely 
on cooperative behaviour in market transactions between different 
parties, for example the proprietor of a bakery and his/her customers. 
Economic man is assumed to have exogenous and fixed preferences, 
and is perfectly rational. Rational is to mean consistent in the ability 
to rank all alternatives (ie more over less) and to choose the one that 
provides the greatest utility.  
 
The assumptions and components of rational choice theory  
 
The essential assumptions of rational choice theory are twofold. 
Firstly, rational choice theory assumes that consumers have utility 
functions showing levels of satisfaction or utility that consumers 
derive, having chosen from every possible set combination of goods 
and services. Secondly, these 'choices' are rational. Rationality 
suggests that these consumers are the finest judges of their own 
interests. Rational choice theory is the brainchild of the Noble Prize 
winner Gary Becker. Becker postulated that individuals respond in 
the same behavioural manner when exposed to different opportunities 
when observed under decision-making and choice evaluations. 
Rational choice theory assumes that individuals are rational. Becker 
himself ‘credits people with enough rationality’ when making choices 
(Becker, 1995, p.650). Becker postulates that selfish motivation and 
altruism are not characteristically inherent in the functioning of 
individual choices. Becker concludes that rational behaviour is found 
consistently in all areas of business and personal activities, ranging 
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from business organizations to households. Becker postulated that 
individuals, irrespective of whether they are situated in households or 
functioning in a business, behave in a way that is deemed rational 
with the direct goal, or pursuit, to maximize utility or wealth. 
There are essential assumptions and components that explain rational 
choice theory. This dissertation uses a model of rational choice theory 
that assumes: 
 The consumer has complete information. 
 The consumer has given preferences of wanting more over less. 
 The consumer has diminishing returns of satisfaction. 
 Consumers always act rationally. 
 Preferences are given or fixed.  
In addition to the assumptions listed above, the model also includes 
certain components that add to its structure, and these components 
are: 
 Consumers have a budget line based on individual incomes. 
 Indifference curves map the purchase of goods. 
 When consumers have more than one choice, choices are 
'complete' and 'transitive'. 
The first assumption listed above states that information is complete, 
but information has an associated cost; in others words, a transaction 
cost. Transaction costs occur when gathering information is costly 
and these costs outweigh the benefits of the action. The rational 
choice theory model in Figure 1 (p.21) assumes that transaction costs 
are very low, that information is freely available with little effort to 
find. Furthermore, as stated in the assumptions just discussed, 
rational choice theory assumes preferences are fixed. Fixed 
preferences are pre-defined and unchanging. The idea of fixed 
preferences follows the important economic principles of transitivity 
and completeness (Morgenstern and Von Neumann, 2004). 
Transitivity simple states that consumers want more over less when 
presented with a set of choices. In the context of the two research 
questions under investigation in this Chapter, this means that when 
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household energy bill payers are exposed to increases in the price of 
electricity more savings in household electricity consumption are 
preferred to fewer savings in household electricity consumption.  
 
Furthermore, in the face of an increase in the price of electricity, 
households weigh up choices that are to either increase electricity or 
decrease electricity or remain constant in the consumption of 
electricity. These choices follow rational behaviour and comply with 
transitivity in that: 
↓E Preferred to NCIEC Preferred to ↑E, then ↓E preferred to ↑E 
 
Where: 
↑ = increase; ↓ = decrease; E = electricity 
NCIEC = no change in electricity consumption 
Therefore, a decrease in electricity consumption is preferred to an 
increase in the electricity consumption when exposed to increases in 
the price of household electricity.  
 
The other logical and important assumption about preferences is that 
choices are complete in that household energy bill payers follow the 
principles of...  
A is preferred to B 
B is preferred to A 
A is indifferent to B    
 
In the context of deriving utility from household electricity 
consumption, completeness means that the household energy bill 
payer has the ability to rank all choices so that: 
Savings are preferred to no saving 
No savings are preferred to savings 
 
Savings or not, it makes no difference 
 
  
Where: 
A is to save on electricity use 
B is not to save on electricity use 
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Research Question 1 
 
Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when 
faced with an increase in the price of household electricity? 
 
With the assumptions and components of rational choice theory 
explained, this section turns to placing these assumptions and 
components of rational choice theory in the context of household 
electricity consumption to test whether they are true, and if so, 
whether they are effective in reducing household energy consumption.  
 
Figure 1 (p.21) frames research question 1 in relation to rational 
choice theory. 
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Figure 1 
A rational choice theory utility maximising energy consumption 
household model 
 
Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when 
faced with an increase in the price of household electricity? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HOUSEHOLD ENERGY 
BILL PAYER 
(Economic man is the energy 
bill payer living in the 
household. The energy bill 
payer is represented as self-
interested.)  
 
TASTES 
(Preferences are 
fixed and 
exogenous) 
 
CHOICES 
(Based on the electricity price increase, 
the energy bill payer can increase, 
decrease, or maintain household energy 
consumption) 
 
 
How much the price 
of electricity 
increases? 
 
 
BUT CHOICES ARE 
LIMITED BY  
 
How much income the 
bill payer earns  
 
AND  
RANKING of CHOICES 
(Bill payer ranks all potentially 
available alternatives rationally by 
following transitivity and 
completeness) 
 
 
UTILITY MAXIMISATION 
(The Bill payer selects the 
choice that the energy bill 
has ranked to be the 
highest in generating the 
greatest utility) 
 
 
Source: author of dissertation  
Energy bill payer is 
informed about a 
price increase in 
electricity. 
Choice 1: savings are 
preferred to no savings 
Choice 3: savings or not, it 
makes no difference 
To utility 
maximise, the 
choice is 
either to 
prefer 
Choice 2: no savings are 
preferred to savings 
Choice 4: the opportunity to purchase efficient household 
appliances that save on energy and therefore on costs 
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Figure 1 (p.21) assumes that the household energy bill payer operates 
in a world where perfect information is available on the different costs 
and benefits of consuming different quantities of household energy. 
Alternatively, if the energy bill payer does not know this information, 
such information is available for free, immediately, accurate, relevant, 
and forms the bases upon which the energy bill payer can rank all 
energy consumption choices rationally, choosing the one that ranks 
highest in utility. Figure 1 (p.21) follows the standard rational choice 
theory model for explaining how the household energy bill payer 
should utility maximise based on knowing the prices of electricity. 
At the top of Figure 1 (p.21) is the household energy bill payer. The 
household energy bill payer represents the traits of self-interest. Given 
the household energy bill payer shall want to maximise his or her 
utility, based on the price of electricity, income and available 
information, the energy bill payer has three choices that shall 
determine whether to become more energy efficient at home based on 
receiving information on the 'rational' benefits of saving household 
energy. Firstly, not to acknowledge or recognise energy efficient 
information, thereby households continue to waste energy (eg by not 
switching off lights). Secondly, to acknowledge and positively respond 
to energy efficient information (eg by actively switching off unused 
lights); and three, to recognise the energy efficient information but not 
believe in the rational benefits and so continue to leave unused lights 
switched on. 
Furthermore, in Figure 1 (p.21), the price of electricity and income of 
the household energy bill payer are both determiners in how the 
information on energy efficiency is interpreted and acted upon. The 
household energy bill payer may actively respond to the information 
more positively if the price for electricity is high and the household 
energy bill payer’s income is low.  
In addition, information on ways in which to become more household 
energy efficient (eg by switching off unused lights) may lead to choices 
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that increase the household energy bill payers' utility by increasing 
the rational benefit from experiencing savings on the electricity bill. 
The bill payer, based on energy efficient information, ranks all choices 
rationally and selects the choice that provides the greatest utility 
maximisation benefit. This is shown in the latter part of Figure 1 
(p.21) under ‘ranking of choices’ and ‘utility maximisation’. By 
following Figure 1 (p.21), the household energy bill payer comes to the 
end of Figure 1 and considers whether the household energy bill payer 
should decrease or increase, or do neither. For the answer, it depends 
on how the household energy bill payer responds (eg electricity 
savings preferred over no electricity savings) to the increase in price. 
Information on energy efficiency and market prices for electricity both 
act as the conduit between ranking rational choices and selecting the 
highest rational benefit. 
Information on the increase in the price of electricity is important. For 
by disseminating the price of electricity to the household energy bill 
payer, this dissemination is able to provide the household energy bill 
payer with information on the costs of household energy. If 
information on energy bills and prices are framed together, then 
research suggests that household energy bill payers respond more 
positively to reducing energy consumption when in the belief that 
monetary gain shall be achieved as opposed to a monetary loss 
(Shipworth, 2002; Yates, 1983). This assumption that the self-
interested rational household energy bill payer prefers a ‘monetary 
gain’ to a ‘monetary loss’ is explicit in Figure 1 (p.21). This inherent 
explicitness is because rational choice theory assumes that the 
household energy bill payer shall want to maximise utility by deriving 
the highest utility from whatever currency is spent on household 
energy consumption. 
According to the studies by Shipworth (2002) and Yates (1983), if 
monetary gain is preferred over a monetary loss, then as the price of 
electricity increases, demand should decrease: this is the Law of 
  24 
Demand. Research compiled in the UK on household electricity use by 
the BERR (2008) presents the annual percentage change of domestic 
electricity demanded as set against the retail price between December 
1997 and December 2008. The data looked at residential tariffs 
suppliers' offered along with the suppliers' incentives to persuade 
household energy efficiency. According to this research by the BERR, 
the trend in domestic electricity demand, on average, does increase 
(along with a decrease in the price of electricity), or decrease, (along 
with an increase in the price of electricity), depending on the 
fluctuations in the retail price changes in electricity. The study 
supports the postulation that the household energy bill payer is 
consumer rational; this rationality decreases electricity consumption, 
given the increase in the unit price of electricity.  
Given the BERR’s study that supports an inversely proportional 
relationship between the price of electricity and household energy 
consumption. ‘Utility maximisation’ in Figure 1 (p.21) supports the 
postulation that the rational energy bill payer should respond with a 
decrease in household energy consumption in response to an increase 
in the price of electricity. The household energy bill payer is price 
sensitive if measured against the price elasticity of demand (PED). The 
price elasticity of demand measures the proportionate responsiveness 
of demand to changes in price. In the context of Figure 1 (p.21), the 
household energy bill payer has three choices in response to a price 
change in electricity, ceteris paribus, and these three choices are: 
 Choice 1: reduce energy consumption (ie savings are 
preferred to no savings) 
 Choice 2: increase energy consumption by using more 
electricity (ie no savings are preferred to savings) 
 Choice 3: maintain energy consumption by not choosing 
to increase or decrease electricity household consumption 
(ie savings or not, it makes no difference) 
 Choice 4: the opportunity to purchase efficient household 
appliances that save on energy and therefore on costs 
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Choice 2 would be unlikely given the sensitivity to price. Choice 3 is 
possible, if the household energy bill payer were to make sacrifices 
somewhere else, for example, dining out fewer times per month and 
using this saved money to pay for electricity bills instead. Choice 4 is 
an option, but the cost of purchasing other appliances for the 
household would probably only be considered if the energy price 
increase was exceptionally high, since time is a factor of price 
elasticity of demand. Therefore, for the short timeframe, the 
household energy bill payer is more inelastic to options of changing 
appliances, but if the price of electricity were to increase regularly, the 
household energy bill becomes more price elastic as the household 
energy bill payer becomes more sensitive to energy price increases and 
seeks alternative methods to save on energy consumption.       
Choice 1 embraces the inherent explicitness of household energy bill 
payers by preferring monetary savings to monetary losses, as 
assumed in Figure 1 (p.21). If monetary savings are preferred to 
monetary losses in the purchase of electricity, then the price elasticity 
of demand should be inelastic in response to a price increase in 
electricity, because electricity is a necessity and has few substitutes. 
Empirical studies are presented in support of Choice 1, and the choice 
to choose 'savings are preferred to no savings' (Figure 1, p.21) ceteris 
paribus.  
Empirical case studies on price inelasticity showing household energy 
bill payers are inelastic to residential electricity consumption: 
evidence to support Choice 1 (p.23) 
The evidence provided in the empirical findings provides results that 
show household energy bill payers are inelastic to increases in the 
price of electricity. To have inelastic demand, the empirical studies 
must find that for every 1% increase in the price of electricity, 
household energy consumption decreases by less than 1%. The price 
elasticity of demand (PED) is calculated as the %∆Qd/%∆P. [Read as 
the percentage change in quantity demanded divided by the 
percentage change in price.]. The empirical findings all have values 
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that are below 1 and thus are inelastic. The explanation for this is the 
correlation between information and price. In the short-run, when 
household energy bill payers are exposed to a price increase, they seek 
to make reductions, but changes in demand for electricity are less 
sensitive to changes in price, perhaps because, household energy bill 
payers consider the price may decrease soon. In the long run, the 
opposite of this is true. When the price continuously rises and 
households are aware of this prolonged increase, then households 
become more sensitive to these continuous price rises. In these cases, 
households are more price elastic to household energy price increases.    
The studies on the price elasticity of demand for residential electricity 
show that there is a significant long-term statistical truth to the 
postulation that household energy bill payers do act rationally (as 
explained by the choice options given in Figure 1, p.21), because 
household energy bill payers decrease electricity consumption when 
faced with a price increase in household electricity.  
Reiss and White (2002) provide data on PED and residential electricity 
consumption based on data published in the Department of Energy. 
The in-home interviews were between 1993 and 1997 in California, 
with a sample size of 1,307. They found that changes in the prices of 
residential electricity lead to an inelasticity in price of 0.39. 
Filippini (1999) reviewed data on electricity consumption in 40 Swiss 
residential households between 1987 and 1990, and found an average 
price inelasticity of 0.30. 
King and Chatterjee (2003) reviewed data on 35 case studies between 
1980 and 2003 on residential and small commercial electricity 
consumption, and found an average price inelasticity of 0.3. 
Maddala et al. (1997) estimated the price elasticity of residential 
electricity consumption presented as statistical means in 49 USA 
states. For the short-term the mean was 0.16 and for the long-term 
0.24. Garcia-Cerratti (2000) also estimated the price elasticity for 
  27 
residential electricity in California, and found a price inelasticity of 
0.17.      
Taylor (1975) reviewed some existing studies on residential, 
commercial, and industrial electricity demand in the USA. Taylor 
found that the price inelasticity of demand on residential electricity 
consumption was between 0.90 in the long-term and 0.13 in the 
short-term.  
Bohi and Zimmerman (1985) conducted wide-ranging reviews on 18 
studies of residential electricity consumption in the USA and found a 
price inelasticity of 0.2 in the short term and 0.7 in long-term. 
According to a more recent study on residential demand for energy, 
Espey and Espey (2004) reviewed 36 studies on residential electricity 
consumption and found a price inelasticity of 0.28 in the short-run 
and 0.81 in the long run. 
Given the research on the sensitivity of price and household energy 
consumption, do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when faced with an increase in the price of household electricity? Yes, 
in that, the theoretical evidence postulated and the empirical evidence 
showed that household energy bill payers were transitive in choice by 
preferring more savings to fewer saving on electricity consumption. 
Furthermore, given that the empirical studies have found that the 
household energy bill payer is sensitive to changes in the market price 
for residential electricity; he or she becomes a prime target for the 
promotion of awareness in the use of household energy efficiency and 
electricity prices. Research question 2 addresses the exposure to 
information on electricity efficiency and price. 
Research Question 2 
Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when 
exposed to information on energy consumption in the 
household? 
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By promoting cost savings through informing the energy bill payer of 
the rational benefits by selecting the choice that provides the greatest 
utility consumption rate at a given price for electricity leads to more 
active choices in support of energy savings by switching off unused 
electrical fixture and fittings in the home. Information, however, must 
be framed in the context of providing information on making choices 
that are more electricity efficient compared with choices that are 
inefficient. The electricity efficient choice compared with the inefficient 
choice represents a divergence between the efficient usage rate of 
electricity and the inefficient usage rate of electricity. The divergence is 
present at any point when electricity is being consumed for no real 
purpose (eg leaving lights switched on in a room that is vacant for 
prolonged periods). The electricity efficient usage rate of electricity is 
individualistic in that ‘efficiency’ is based solely on the choices (eg to 
choose to switch off unused lights) of the individuals living in the 
home, ceteris paribus. The theoretical divergence between efficient and 
inefficient household energy consumption usage rates are illustrated 
in Figure 2 (p.29). 
Though switching off unused lights would result in household energy 
savings, it is worth mentioning that it is not a costless activity to 
undertake. Changing regular behaviour requires significant effort and 
the breaking of habits that over the prolonged period of time would be 
difficult to maintain.  
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Given the previously discussed studies (Taylor 1975; Bohi and Zammerman, 1985; Maddla, 1997; Garcia-Cerratti, 
2000; Espey and Espey, 2004; Filippini, 1999; King and Chatterjee, 2003; Reiss and White, 2002) that provide 
statistical evidence that the residential electricity bill payer is price sensitive, information that highlights and informs 
the energy bill payer of the price for electricity could provide the encouragement and incentive to switch off unused 
lights. This could be done with slogans, written on the energy bill, such as: 
 
‘Are you economising your energy bills by being energy efficient?’ 
 
Inefficient use of electricity:  
UR = 1,500 x £0.21 = £315 
 
Efficient use of electricity: 
UR1 = 1,250 x £0.21 = £262.5 
 
Literature providing evidence for households 
actively seeking to become more energy efficient 
in the support of the theoretical shift from UR to 
WRCUR include studies by Seligman and 
Darley, 1977; Winett et al., 1982; Hebrelein and 
Baumgartner, 1985; Haakana et al., 1997; 
Wilhite, 1997; Brandon and Lewis, 1999; 
McCalley and Midden, 2002 and Mountain, 
2006)  
                 
Figure 2: The divergence between efficient and inefficient household energy consumption 
 
Source: diagram and diagram contents are the ideas 
of the dissertation author 
Key to the abbreviations in Figure 2 
UR stands for the Usage Rate of electricity in the household. S of E stands for the Supply of 
Electricity from the supplier to the household.   
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The numbers provided in Figure 2 (p.29) are arbitrary. Any figures 
could have been used to illustrate the divergence between efficient and 
inefficient uses of electricity in the household. On the y-axis in Figure 
2 (p.29) is the price of electricity per unit supplied to the household. 
Figure 2 assumes that the price of electricity is supplied at a constant 
price of £0.21 per unit of electricity; therefore, the supply curve is 
perfectly elastic. On the x-axis is the number of electricity units 
consumed in the household. In Figure 2 (p.29), without executing 
efficiency measures, the household energy bill payer uses 1500 units 
of electricity at a price of £0.21 per unit of supplied electricity. With a 
price of £0.21 per unit and at an electricity household consumption 
rate of 1500 units, the household energy bill payer uses £315 worth of 
electricity. However, information disseminated to the household 
energy bill payer that provides information on electricity efficiency and 
the potential savings available by being aware of the use of electricity 
in the home highlights potential inefficiency behaviour. Therefore, UR 
shifts to UR1 and the number of electricity units used decreases. The 
shift in demand comes from household energy bill payers responding 
to preferring more savings over less savings as outlined by rational 
choice theory. By shifting the usage rate to UR1, the household energy 
bill payer has reduced the electricity bill by £52.50, having a new total 
of £262.50. The decrease in the electricity bill stems from the choice to 
switch off unused lights and unused electrical appliances. 
Though Figure 2 (p.29) represents only a theoretical shift in the use of 
electricity, empirical studies on the awareness of energy efficiency 
have proved successful in saving money on household energy bills. 
Discussed below, these studies do support a relationship between the 
evidence that suggests that the household energy bill payer is price 
sensitive by the means of using this sensitivity as an incentive to 
encourage energy users to become more household energy efficient. 
This relationship, along with the case studies presented below, 
supports the theoretical shift from UR to UR1 in Figure 2 (p.29).  
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Empirical case studies to support research question 2: do 
household energy bill payers make rational choices when 
exposed to information on energy consumption in the 
household? 
 
Information has (based on the ways in which to reduce household 
electricity consumption) provided some positive results in households 
becoming more energy efficient. The wide-body of literature discussed 
below uses a variety of different strategies to reach, or aspire to reach, 
ways that may change household energy behaviour so that household 
energy bill payers want to remain at point UR1 in Figure 2 (p.29).  
However, by using different mediums to disseminate information, this 
requires the weighing up of transaction costs. If the dissemination of 
providing information to household energy bill payers exceeds the 
savings that could be potentially made, then the information is too 
expensive, because household energy bill payers would not actively 
seek energy reductions if the cost of finding the information exceeds 
the benefits of changing behaviour. 
Studies using informative billing  
One method of convincing household energy bill payers to shift from 
UR to UR1 (Figure 2, p.29) is to use informative billing. Informative 
billing is providing the household energy bill payer with information 
on the use of electricity and its associated costs. Over time, 
informative billing provides feedback that allows for educational 
learning on the ways that can lead to electricity savings. By informing 
household energy, bill payers of this informative billing may lead to 
reductions in electricity use. Winett et al. (1982) undertook a study in 
the USA on improving household electricity consumption based on 
daily informational feedback from videotape recordings that 
demonstrated alternatives for comfort without having to increase the 
air-conditioning or heating in the home. The survey was undertaken 
in the summer and the winter with samples sizes of 53 and 85 
respectively. According to this study, one effective method of delivering 
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energy messages to household energy users is to use closed-circuit 
video programs that provide information on how energy choices can 
lead to energy savings. The study found that energy savings were 
around 15 per cent as a result from watching video information on 
energy conservation. 
Another method of informative billing is to use brochures and notices. 
Hebrelein and Baumgartner (1985) carried out comparison studies in 
the USA on household energy efficiency using brochures and notices 
included with the energy bill or a more detail information package that 
included monitoring advice and detailed information on energy rates. 
According to this study, comprehensive information packages tailored 
to time-of-use supports household energy efficiency. The study found 
that households saved between 10 and 15 per cent on household 
energy bills.  
Regular informative billing as provided some positive results for 
reductions in electricity use. A study by Haakana et al. (1998) of 105 
households in Finland, by the Department of Home Economics, on 
supplying information on energy efficiency by sending monthly 
feedback of meter readings found that 54% of the 105 households 
actively switched off unused lights. When asked why, the study found 
that 68% of the sample said switching off lights culminated in 
monetary savings on household energy bills. Further results of the 
Haakana et al. study found that household energy consumption 
feedback encouraged 40% of the sample to become more aware than 
they were before the survey of current household energy consumption 
rates.  
If household energy bill payers respond to awareness over time, then 
the time-period may have an impact of how effective these energy 
reductions are. Palmer, Lloyd, and Lloyd (1977) suggest using daily 
prompts as the focus on informative billing by using information on 
electricity consumption as daily prompts. The study consisted of four 
households in Iowa and lasted for 106 days. The informational 
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feedback consisted of a card placed on a window of each household 
each night detailing the consumption of electricity for that day as 
measured by the baseline that looked at the average consumption for 
that household. In addition to the card information was the monetary 
cost information for the month based on current usage rate. Across 
the household, the average reductions of household electricity 
consumption were 16 per cent. 
Studies using informative billing and monetary or goal incentives 
The results from informative billing prove that a theoretical shift from 
UR to UR1 in Figure 2 (p.29) is possible when using informative 
billing. However, further results show that positive results are 
obtained when the household energy bill payer uses not only feedback 
but links this feedback with monetary incentives to create monetary-
incentive-feedback or goal-incentive-feedback. The goal could be a 
simple one such as using less household energy than the neighbours 
use. Konhlenberg et al. (1976) investigated the effects of information 
feedback and feedback plus monetary incentives (money reductions if 
the survey participants reduced energy consumption) on household 
electricity consumption during peak times. The study involved three 
households in Seattle, USA, and lasted for three months between 
January and March in 1976. The research consisted of 24-hour chart 
recorders placed in each of the residence homes to monitor each 
household's electricity consumption every 15 minutes. Information 
was fed to households, when these households were using excessive 
electricity as measured by a baseline of electricity use. The study 
found that information coupled with monetary incentives reduced 
household electricity consumption by 50 per cent in peak times of 
use. Therefore, when information is coupled with rational choices (in 
this case a monetary incentive to reduce electricity consumption), 
significant results are obtained. According to the research however, 
when information alone was used, the study found little difference in 
the consumption of electricity at peak times. 
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Becker (1978) used the dissemination of information in conjunction 
with goal setting to reduce electricity consumption. The dissemination 
of information consisted of an information sheet detailing the 
electricity use of different appliances in the study group. The study 
involved 100 families in New Jersey over the months between June 
and August. To find the baseline, researchers recorded meter readings 
of average electricity consumption for 9 weeks. The study groups were 
asked to set goals as to how much electricity they could save over the 
experimental period. The findings of the research concluded that the 
highest saving was 13 per cent based on the goal to reduce electricity 
consumption by 20%. 
Hayes and Cone (1977) used informative billing and the economic 
principle of transitivity (ie wanting more over less) to analyse the 
effects of electricity consumption. The study involved feedback 
information and cash-back. Cash-back was rewarded to participants 
that made reductions between 10 per cent to more than 50 per cent 
(eg a reduction of between 20%-29% was rewarded with a cash-back 
of $6). The study was between January and May and consisted of one 
group of students at the West Virginia University. Feedback was on 
electricity consumption for cooking, refrigeration, ventilation, and fans 
and was recorded using group meters. These readings acted as the 
baselines for consumption above or below the baseline. The findings 
from the research found savings of between 15 and 20 per cent.    
Studies using technology such as electricity meters and computers 
Given that most, if not all, households have electricity meters. Meter 
reading feedback has the potential to provide effective reductions in 
household energy use to create a shift from UR to UR1 in Figure 2 
(p.29). Seligman and Darley (1977) examined the effects of meter 
reading feedback. The baseline was based on meter readings taken 
prior the study over 5 weeks. The monitors were attached to an 
outside window of each house. The study consisted of four homes 
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using air conditioning, lighting and refrigeration. The study lasted for 
three months beginning in July and ending in September. The results 
of the study found that the group receiving the feedback used 11 per 
cent less electricity than the group that did not receive any feedback.  
Given that meters are in most households, it is prudent to encourage 
the homeowner to monitor their own electricity meter and therefore 
self-learn to reduce electricity consumption. Wilhite (1997) examined 
the effects of households reading their own utility meters and sending 
the information to the utility supplier. Informative billing information 
was sent to these households detailing their electricity consumption. 
The purpose of the study was to use information about electricity 
consumption to create awareness. The study ran from March 1995 to 
December 1996, and was in Norway, with a sample size of 2000. 
Three years after the experimental awareness study had taken place; 
informative billing had the effect of reducing household electricity 
consumption by 8 per cent.  
Using regular meter-reading feedback to support the learning process 
was central to Wilhite and Ling (1995). The idea here is to make sure 
household energy bill payers do not relapse on the reductions once 
they are made (ie maintain the position of UR1 in Figure 2, p.29). 
Whilhite and Ling investigated how often dissemination of information 
can affect household electricity consumption. The Norway study 
consisted of information supplied to the studied groups six times a 
year based on meter readings along with basic written text and 
graphics presenting each phase compared with the previous year. 
With a sample size of 675 and project duration of three years, results 
were a 10 per cent saving. 
Current regular informational feedback in the home was the focus of 
Mountain (2006). The idea here is that the household energy bill payer 
can monitor electricity use and adjust accordingly based on previous 
efforts in the hope to maintain a constant reduction in household 
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electricity use. Mountain investigated the use of electricity information 
consumption using monitors placed in the household. These monitors 
provide instantaneous information about the amount of electricity 
currently consumed and the price of electricity. The Canadian study 
lasted for 2.5 years with a sample size of 505. The results showed that 
a 6.5 per cent saving was achieved. 
Another study on in-home monitors also provided reductions in 
household electricity use. McClelland and Cook (1979-80) examined 
how the use of information on in-home electricity monitors affects 
household electricity consumption. The study consisted of 101 family 
homes over an 11-month period in the USA. The results of the study 
found a 12 per cent saving for the homes that were equipped with the 
in-home electrical monitors.  
It has been discussed that electricity meters are a very effective and 
useful tool for monitoring household electricity use, Brandon and 
Lewis (1999) examined the effects of information disseminated directly 
to the home via the personal computer. The UK study consisted of 120 
persons in groups of eight and lasted for 9 months. According to the 
research study, the authors claim that having the ability to view and 
obtain feedback from the supplier of electricity on the usage rates and 
times of use provides savings in the magnitude of 12 per cent over the 
study period.   
Benders et al. (2006) also uses technology to aid in the awareness of 
maintaining household energy reductions and thus providing the 
incentive to stay at point UR1 in Figure 2 (p.29). Benders et al. 
investigated the role of information and technology as a tool for 
informing electricity usage. With a sample size of 137 households over 
a research period of 5 months in the Netherlands, the study consisted 
of an informative based web site which consisting of three parts. 
These three parts were questionnaire measuring the energy 
prerequisite before commencement of the experiment, information 
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requirements on how to reduce energy options and a feedback 
segment viewing the effects of the changed behaviour. As a result, the 
experiment found that household energy savings were 8.5 per cent 
over the study period.   
 
Given the vast array of modern appliances found in the home, 
technology is also useful in finding out how much electricity these 
appliances use and by finding this out, it may help to change the way 
in which households use them, and this information supports the 
shift from WR to UR1 in Figure 2 (p.29). Households require 
information on how much energy these appliances use. Targeting 
appliances was the focus of a study by McCalley and Midden (2002) 
who examined electricity use and washing machines. The study 
consisted of 20 washing trails with a sample size of 100 that 
measured electricity consumption per wash in a computerised 
machine-washing simulation. These lab experiments were also 
undertaken in the field to target behaviour that would focus the 
attention on the load and temperature settings. The field experiments 
found that by installing energy meters on washing machines 
household energy bill payers focused more on the costs of running 
washing machines. This attention and focus created an 18 per cent 
saving through being more efficient, in terms of water temperature, 
spinning speed, and the duration of the wash.     
 
Conclusion 
This Chapter began by asking two research questions, these questions 
were: 
 Q1: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when faced with an increase in the price of household 
electricity? 
 Q2: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices 
when exposed to information on energy consumption in the 
household? 
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These questions were designed to test the hypothesis of rational 
choice theory. In particular, do household energy bill payers abide by 
the axioms of transitivity and completeness? 
  
For research question 1, the research found that household energy bill 
payers are sensitive to price changes in electricity so that when the 
price of electricity increases demand decreases. Therefore, given the 
empirical findings, the answer to research question 1 is that when the 
price of electricity increases, consumption of household electricity 
decreases. The fall in electricity consumption provides the evidence 
that rational choice theory is validated in that household energy bill 
payers seek to maximise utility by choosing the option 'savings are 
preferred to no savings' in household electricity use (Figure 1, p.21). 
This choice supports transitivity and completeness. 
 
For research question 2, information fell under the spotlight. In 
particular, how information can affect household electricity 
consumption. The empirical evidence suggests that when household 
energy bill payers become aware of electricity use in the home, 
household energy bill payers seek to make reductions in electricity 
consumption to maximise efficiency as set against the cost of 
electricity. From a rational choice theory perspective, the research on 
households making savings on energy use through computer 
technology is worth pursuing in that the results from this area are 
encouraging. The primary reason for this is that it is easier to make 
rational choices if these choices are visibly seen so that comparisons 
can be made. By having information fed to homes, perhaps via email, 
transaction costs remain low. Furthermore, technology allows homes 
to have devices placed in the home that glow when a lot of energy is 
being used above the common usage baseline for that household.  
 
Rational choice theory has been validated in that household energy 
bill payers wish to make changes to consumption that allow for utility 
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maximisation by setting in motion activities that allow for savings to 
be preferred to no savings in household electricity use (Figure 1, p.21). 
  
Chapter 3 expands the rational choice model to include social 
preferences in the form of the social preference extension strategy. The 
purpose of the social preference extension strategy is to support 
rational choice theory, but at the same time, expand its borders that 
shall help to persuade household energy bill payers to reduce 
electricity use in the home. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
The Attachment of a Social Preference Extension Strategy to 
Rational Choice Theory in Relation to Household Related 
Energy Consumption: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations 
into Household Energy Conservation 
 
Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 portrayed household energy bill payers as rational actors 
making rational choices. Chapter 2 found that household energy bill 
payers do abide by rational choices when exposed to an increase in 
the price of household electricity. 
 
The first two research questions in Chapter 2 have laid the foundation 
to allow for the third research question. The 3rd research question is:  
Q3: Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect on 
household energy bill payers' electricity consumption? 
 
Research question 3 brings into the mix of rational choice theory the 
side of the household energy bill payer that is social. Until now, it has 
been assumed that the household energy bill payer makes choices 
based only on the premise of wanting to save money, and that these 
choices are only influenced by price. The social side of the household 
energy bill payer represents the times when the household energy bill 
payer allows for context-dependent preferences to affect the choice of 
what bundle set is chosen. Therefore, with the aid of the social 
preference extension strategy, economic man morphs into Social-
Economic Man.  
 
Social-Economic Man only represents one household energy bill payer 
at any one time, but this energy bill payer has different choice traits, 
some of which are purely economic, whereas others are more social. 
The idea of Social-Economic Man is not a new one (cf Duesenberry, 
1949; Leibenstein, 1950; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Loomes and 
Sudgen, 1982; Davis and Holt, 1993; Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998; 
Loomes, 1998, 1999; Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Bowles, 2004 and 
  41 
Akerlof and Kranton, 2005). However, the insights into research 
question 3 bring new dimensions to an old problem of using only 
exogenous preferences in that research question 3 breaks down how 
household energy bill payers' economic and social sides view the 
decision process from different angles and perspectives, allowing for 
wider endogenous influences to affect choices. 
 
The research objective of Chapter 3 is to design a model that 
incorporates the social preference extension strategy (Figure 3, p.50). 
To meet the research objective, the research strategy is to map how 
the household energy bill payer makes choices under the premise of 
rational choice theory and secondly, how the household energy bill 
payer maps choices when influenced by the social preference 
extension strategy. Empirical evidence on social preferences shall test 
the model (Figure 3, p.50) to assess its robustness. The measure of 
success shall be if the social preference extension strategy in Figure 3 
(p.50) provides potential real-world application based on whether the 
social preference extension strategy can decrease household energy 
consumption. The judge of this potential real-world application is 
whether the theoretical model of Figure 3 (p.50) complements the 
research literature on peer pressure and social norms (ie social 
preferences).  
 
However, before peer pressure and social norms can be incorporated 
into Figure B in Figure 3 (p.50), is there any empirical evidence to 
suggest that social preferences do exist and have the potential to 
affect household energy bill payers' choices? 
  
Literature review on social preferences  
Chapter 2 supported the view that, under the right conditions, 
rational choice theory provides an explanation for why household 
energy bill payers would want to opt to conserve household electricity, 
based on given preferences and rational choices. However, a wave of 
economic literature has been provided to show support that social 
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preferences are also used when choices are being made. Social 
preferences are preferences that are partly determined by what others 
have chosen. Research in the field of behavioural economics has 
provided countless experiments for when social preferences affect the 
choices of the participating parties (Duesenberry, 1949; Leibenstein, 
1950; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Loomes and Sudgen, 1982; 
Davis and Holt, 1993; Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998; Loomes, 1998, 
1999; Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Bowles, 2004; Akerlof and Kranton, 
2005).  
 
According to Duesenberry (1949), individuals have systematically 
context-dependent utilities that suggest individuals shall make 
choices that are partly determined by the choices of others in that 
these choices are observed and then copied.  
 
Leibenstein (1950, p.190) researched observed consumption. 
Leibenstein used the term ‘bandwagon effect’ to describe how 
individuals copy the choices of other individuals. The bandwagon 
effect is underpinned by the assumption that individuals want to 
conform and makes choices that represent people like themselves. 
 
Wanting to conform to others like themselves was the focus of 
research by Akerlof and Kranton (2005). The idea situated around the 
premise is that non-pecuniary incentives are correlated with 
individual identity so that the understandings that preferences are 
exogenous and stable are questioned. Individual identity is the 
awareness individuals have of themselves, and how this awareness is 
interpreted and observed by other individuals. The research found 
that individual identity could seriously affect people’s choices. Based 
on their research, if an individual is environmentally aware, but not 
actively environmental, then this individual is more likely to reduce 
domestic household energy consumption if friends or family has 
chosen to reduce household energy consumption. If individuals are 
copying the choices of other individuals, then preferences are not 
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fixed, because the choice to reduce household energy consumption is 
not solely because of changes in the price of electricity, though price 
plays its part, but friends and family who have already reduced 
household energy consumption also affect the change in household 
electricity consumption.  
Being influenced by others was the interest of Camerson and Thaler 
(1995). The context of the experiment was that X has received a fixed 
sum of money that he must distribute between himself and another 
player; Y. X can make any offer to Y, but if Y rejects this offer, then 
both players receive nothing. According to the research, the majority 
of offers were between 30% – 40% of the original sum of money, with 
some of X’s offers 50% of the original sum of money. When, however, 
X offered less than 20% of the original sum of money, Y tended to 
reject these offers. These rejections allow for the possibility that Y is 
choosing whether to reject or accept based on the choice of offer given 
by X. If this is the case, then Y’s choices are partly being determined 
by X’s choices, and therefore Y’s preferences are no longer exogenous 
and stable, but partly represented by the manipulation from X’s 
choices. The core of the research suggests that players are willing to 
invest in the stabilisation of social norms by sacrificing gain to correct 
an unfair exchange. Hoffman et al. (1996) provided an interesting 
extension to the experiment in that Hoffman removed Y’s ability to 
reject any offer from X. The game now becomes a dictatorship. When 
the experiments were again run as a dictatorship, the offer to Y was 
much less, but it was not zero. According to Hoffman, the reason for 
this tendency was for X to place greater importance on what the 
experimenter thought of X. From this premise, offers were being 
manipulated by social preferences based on what X thought the 
experimenter would do under the same circumstances, X was trying to 
copy this theoretical experimenter's choice.    
Similar research by Loomes (1999) supports the results by Camerson 
and Thaler. Loomes (1999, F42) provided an experiment in which £10 
was divided between two people. Loomes undertook two experiments. 
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The experiments consisted of two players. The instructions of the 
experiment were that one of the players had to divide £10 between 
himself and player 2, using any monetary denomination. Player 2 had 
two choices. Player 2 could either accept the offer from Player 1, or 
reject it. If Player 2 rejected the offer from Player 1, then both players 
received nothing. 
  
Table 1 (p.41) presents the offers. The first letter in the series 
represents the sum of money (ie a, b, c, or d) kept by Player 1 (the 
subscript, p1). The second letter represents the offer to Player 2 (p2) 
that is accepted or rejected. The letter ‘R’ denotes that Player 2 chose 
not to accept the offer from Player 1. The combinations of letters in 
red represent the offer, acceptance, or rejections between both Players 
1 and 2 in each experiment. The premise of the experiment is to 
assume that both players are not affected by the choice of offer or 
choice of rejection of each of the other players in the game. (That is, 
they are individually playing their own game so that they can each 
maximise utility.) An adapted recreation of the experiment is below. 
 
Table 1: The £10 experiment of choice 
 
E = even; U = uneven; R = rejected offer; A = accept; P1 = Player 1; 
P2 = player 2; a = £9; b = £5; c = £1; d = £0 
 
Exogenous, Fixed Preferences            Endogenous, Social Preferences   
                                                                         
    Experiment 1      Experiment 2             
 A     A           A   A  
E bp1, bp2    E E   bp1, bp2  
U         ap1, cp2                                 A     R          
                                                                        U   ap1, cp2, R  
          
 
 
 
 
Experiment 1 demonstrates Player 2 chooses the option that displays 
the axioms of self-interest and fixed preferences along with not 
£5 each 
Player 1 £9,
player 2 £1 
 
  £5 each 
 
 Player 1 £9, Player 2 £1,    
rejection 'R' from player 2, both 
receive nothing. 
 
Source: adapted from Loomes (1999, F42) 
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questioning or considering why Player 1 has made such an offer. 
Player 1 selects the preferred choice (ie the one in red) by rationally 
ranking all the alternatives and selecting the one that provides the 
greatest utility from all choices offered, irrespective of what the other 
player has said, done, or offered. In Experiment 1, depending on the 
offer from Player 1, Player 2 shall choose (E, A) over (U, A). This is 
because in terms of the offer (E, A), b > c (ie ‘b’ has a monetary value 
of £5 whereas ‘c’ has a monetary value of £1) when compared to the 
offer of (U, A) which has c > d (ie ‘c’ has a monetary value of £1 
whereas ‘d’ has a monetary value of £0). Player 2 would not have 
refused the offer of (U, A), just because it has a less monetary value. 
Player 2 prefers to have some money as opposed to receiving no 
money, and shall rank preferences rationally according to the utility 
received from each offer under the premise more is preferred to less.  
 
Experiment 2 includes social preferences in the choice ranking 
process. Experiment 2 found that when Player 2 considers the offer of 
(U, R), Player 2 also evaluated how fair the choice offer is (given as 
‘ap1, cp2’ in Experiment 1, and ‘ap1, cp2R’ in Experiment 2), and, 
based on this measure of fairness, rejects the offer. Player 2 is not 
exhibiting exogenous and fixed preferences, but social preferences. 
Player 2 has decided to prevent Player 1 from receiving the full £9 by 
sacrificing the £1 Player 2 would have received. Player 2’s choice is 
partly based on the decision that Player 1 only choose to offer Player 2 
£1 of the £10.  
 
Unlike Loomes's experiment designed to test the presence of social 
preferences in a controlled experiment, Sagoff (2004) discusses social 
preferences in a real-world context. This context was when a scout 
arrived at his home knocking on the door brandishing cookies for sale. 
Sagoff explains that he purchased some cookies from the scout. Sagoff 
then goes on to explain that he does not care for cookies: he took the 
cookies to work for his friends to eat. The circumstances surrounding 
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this transaction are important. The scout lived in his neighboured; in 
fact, the scout lived next door to Sagoff. The scout had frequented 
other residents’ homes in the scout’s own neighboured. Sagoff bought 
cookies purely because this was the choice of his neighbours. Social 
preferences have persuaded him to copy his neighbours, because he 
felt he ought to buy cookies.  
 
From the literature, it is evident that social preferences do exist and 
are capable of influencing household energy bill payers' choices and 
are therefore vindicated for the use in Figure B within Figure 3 (p.50).  
 
Though the discussion around these different experiments have 
provided evidence of social preferences to help explain individual 
choices, this Chapter suggests that the reason economics  views 
individuals as not having, or not including social preferences, in 
models explaining choices, is because ‘economic man’ and ‘social man’ 
are often interpreted as separate individuals when deriving and 
making choices. Therefore, this separation of decisions culminates 
into different interpretations, as for how choices are selected. This 
separation is the focus of the next section. 
 
The difference between the characteristics underpinning exogenous 
preferences and endogenous preferences 
 
This Chapter suggests that the household energy bill payer is part 
‘economic’ and part ‘social’, and derives choices based sometimes on 
purely economic choice traits (eg more is preferred to less) and 
sometimes on social choice traits (eg conforming to the social norm in 
small local communities). By bringing these choice traits of economic 
man and social man together, this bringing togetherness creates 
Social-Economic Man. Social-Economic Man is only one man. The 
choices over goods and services used or consumed are based on 
choices that are underpinned by all the characteristics inherent in 
this one man. Characteristics like self-interest, exogenous and 
endogenous preferences, and rational behaviour.   
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Whereas Chapter 2 primarily discussed and documented the choice 
traits of solely a household energy bill payer as a bill payer who has 
exogenous and given preferences, and is almost completely motivated 
by self-interest in the pursuit of utility-maximisation, social man is 
too a household energy bill who is guided by self-interest, but does not 
have exogenous or given preferences. The key that differentiates the 
characteristics between the two sides of Social-Economic Man is the 
fact that on the side of social man his choices are malleable, because 
choices are influenced by persuasion and imitation of others, both of 
which affect which option Social-Economic Man shall choose. Given 
that social man’s choices are partly determined by what other 
individuals choose, preferences are endogenous. I define endogenous 
preferences as: 
Definition of Endogenous preferences 
Preferences are endogenous when the individual allows his or her 
choices to be a function of context-dependency insofar as this context-
dependency affects choices over time based on what other individuals 
have chosen in the past, what other individuals choose at the present, 
or what other individuals shall choose at some known point in the 
known future. 
 
Source: This definition is based on (Bowles, 2004, p.97).  
 
When preferences are endogenous, preferences are represented from 
inside the household energy bill payer's utility model. A further 
characteristic underpinning endogenous preferences is that the 
ranking of preferences can be determined by social norms and peer 
pressure. Social norms and peer pressure are outside the boundaries 
of the conventional consumer utility model that relies on given 
preferences and choices that solely change because of increases or 
decreases in prices. 
 
Furthermore, when framed endogenously, preferences are not stable, 
because household energy bill payers' preferences are influenced by 
the choices of other household energy bill payers' preferences insofar 
as one energy bill payer shall copy from another energy bill payer by 
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choosing the same choice based on what the other energy bill payer 
chose, therefore, imitating the same choice. A change in choice stems 
from a change in preference by having household energy bill payers 
introduce a new preference (ie one that was not present before) into 
the household energy bill payer's utility model. This ‘new preference’ is 
the reason behind why household energy bill payers rank preferences 
differently in that endogenous preferences can change choice through 
the imitation and persuasion of others that in turn can change the 
ranking of preferences. 
 
In contrast, when preferences are framed exogenously, preferences are 
stable in that preferences are not influenced by the choices of other 
household energy bill payers. Therefore, by having existing 
unchanging preferences (ie preferences that are not open to 
persuasion or imitation from others), choices only change the ranking 
of fixed preferences (eg A preferred to B) when prices and incomes 
increase or decrease. Preferences remain fixed. Research question 3 
challenges this 'remain fixed' assumption.  
Research Question 3 
 
Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect on 
household energy bill payers' electricity consumption? 
 
Loomes's £10 experiment (Table 1, p.41) shows that there are 
identifiable differences between preferences that are exogenous and 
given and preferences that are endogenous and malleable.  
 
Chapter 2 only discussed household energy conservation in terms of 
when preferences are exogenous and given. Choices to reduce 
household energy consumption were solely based on the changes of 
the price of electricity and that the increase in the price of electricity 
does provide the incentive for the household energy bill payer to 
become more efficient in electricity use in the household by switching 
off unused lights. Apart from the price of electricity, no other 
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considerations were taken into account for decreasing electricity 
consumption in the household in Figure 1 (Chapter 2, p.21). 
 
Given the support for social preferences, what is proposed is a social 
preference extension strategy that allows peer pressure to influence 
the amount of electricity used in the household. Peer pressure is when 
the community or society in general place pressure on others in the 
community to conform by following the choices that represent the 
choices of the majority of the community. Figure 3 (p.50) provides the 
contrast between rational choice theory with and without the social 
preference extension strategy.             
   
 
  50 
                                                           
                                                                    
                                                                                                                                                      
  
 
 
 
  
Household energy bill payer 
(HEBP) 
(HEBP is self-interested; 
economic man represents 
HEBP) 
Tastes or 
preferences 
(Preferences are 
exogenous, stable 
and given) 
Choices 
Based on the assumption of perfect 
information, HEBP chooses to be 
for, against or indifferent in the 
pursuit of household energy 
conservation. 
Prices of electricity supplied to HEBP 
(Exogenous, but not stable, or given) 
Income of HEBP 
(Exogenous, but not 
stable or given) 
Utility maximisation 
HEBP selects the choice ranked the highest in generating the 
greatest utility 
Ranking of choices 
HEBP ranks all potentially 
available alternatives 
rationally, under the axioms 
of rational preferences 
BUT HEBP 
CONSERVATION 
CHOICES ARE 
AFFECTED BY THE 
AND 
THE  
HEBP has 
access to 
perfect 
information 
 
Household energy bill payer 
HEBP is self-interested; 
Social-Economic Man 
represents HEBP 
Tastes of 
preferences 
(Preferences are 
exogenous, stable 
and given) 
Extension strategy 
that represents social 
preferences 
HEBP makes energy 
reductions that are 
partly determined by 
social norms and peer 
pressure from other 
HEBPs who have 
already made energy 
reductions 
Choices 
Based on the assumption 
of perfect information, 
HEBP chooses to be for, 
against or indifferent in the 
pursuit of household 
energy conservation. 
 
Prices of electricity 
supplied to HEBP 
(Exogenous, but not stable, 
or given) 
 
Income of HEBP 
(Exogenous, but not 
stable or given) 
 
Ranking of choices 
HEBP ranks all 
potentially available 
alternatives rationally, 
under the axioms of 
rational preferences 
 
Utility maximisation 
HEBP selects the choice ranked 
the highest in generating the 
greatest utility 
 
HEBP has 
access to 
perfect 
information 
 
Figure A: Consumer and rational choice theory: household energy conservation 
Figure B: Consumer and rational choice theory with a social preference 
extension strategy: household energy conservation 
However, both 
choices affected 
by 
Social preferences 
can affect choices, 
which are 
endogenous, 
unstable and not 
given 
AND 
THE 
To include social 
preferences in the 
context of peer 
pressure means 
Social-Economic 
Man represents the 
choices of HEBP 
To exclude social 
preferences means that 
only economic man 
represents the choices of 
HEBP 
Source: author of dissertation  
Figure 3: The divergence between consumer and rational choice theory and consumer and rational choice theory with a social preference extension strategy: 
household energy conservation 
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Figure 3 (p.50) compares and explains the theoretical divergence 
between consumer and rational choice theory and consumer and 
rational choice theory with social preferences. In Figure 3 (p.50), lies 
Figure A. Figure A displays the choices of the household energy bill 
payer from a purely exogenous, stable and given preference premise. 
Chapter 2 extensively explained exogenous preferences in the context 
of household energy conservation. The sequence on the right, Figure 
B, (in Figure 3, p.50), includes the social preference extension 
strategy. 
 
The social preference extension strategy incorporates the times when 
choices are influenced by the choices of other household energy bill 
payers. The social preference extension strategy does not exclude the 
premise that some household energy bill payers would not take into 
account what other household energy bill payers have chosen. Figure 
B (p.50) begins from a similar starting point as Figure A (p.50), though 
there is a divergence. The divergence occurs after the household 
energy bill payers weigh up the choices as being for, against or 
indifferent to energy conservation. At this point, household energy bill 
payers could decide that social preferences are not important and omit 
the effects of them from the choice decision. If this were the case, then 
the sequence is no different from Figure A (p.50). However, if the 
household energy bill payer allows social preferences to interfere with 
the household energy bill payer's decision and choice sequence then 
the choice outcome is different.  
 
This difference in path creates the divergence between Figures A and 
B (p.50). In Figure A, choices are price and income based. In Figure B, 
the household energy bill payer is still for, against or indifferent and 
shall rank, rationally, these choices and select the one that provides 
the greatest utility, however, the way in which these choices are 
ranked is different. Following the choice of Figure A (p.50), the 
household energy bill payer would rank choices of reducing household 
energy consumption as for energy conservation is preferred to against 
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energy conservation or against energy conservation is preferred to for 
energy conservation in the pursuit of the energy bill payer reducing 
electricity consumption in the household. In Figure 3, Figure A (p.50), 
the choice as to which is chosen would depend upon electricity prices 
(ie potential savings on electricity household bills) and income (ie the 
proportion of income spent on household electricity bills), and nothing 
else. The household energy bill payer represented in Figure A (p.50) is 
not interested in what other household energy bill payers think or 
choose. Figure A (p.50) represents rational choice theory, but is 
incomplete in that most decisions are not solely determined by the 
price of electricity and the household energy bill payer's income. 
However, Figure A (p.50) is not wrong, but simply underdeveloped, in 
explaining household energy bill payers' choices, for many choices are 
perfectly explained by how much things cost and whether or not it is 
affordable. However, notwithstanding there is underdevelopment.  
 
Figure B (p.50) addresses this underdevelopment in the aid to help 
formulate policy that can target social preferences for reductions in 
household energy consumption. The social preference extension 
strategy in Figure B (p.50) allows for the possibility that other factors 
are important in the choice making process and may influence choice 
to switch unused lights off in the household. When framed in the 
context of what the community is doing, the household energy bill 
payer who uses more energy than the rest of the community might feel 
peer pressure to conform to the rest of the community. Household 
energy bill payers' choices are, therefore, endogenous (ie are formed 
from inside the utility model) are unstable (ie are completely new) and 
are not given (ie social preferences are not intrinsic because they only 
exist if the household energy bill payers want to create them, 
acknowledge them, and act on them). Overall, Table 2 (p.53) below 
distinguishes the differences between Figure A and Figure B in Figure 
3 on page 50. 
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Table 2 
  
The differences between Figures A and B in Figure 3 on page 50 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
HEBP = household energy bill payer 
 
Figure A                                                                                     
HEBP is self-interested; 
economic man represents HEBP 
Preferences are: 
Exogenous and fixed 
Choices are: 
Income and price limit choices. 
Ranking of choices follow that: 
The ranking of choice follows 
the axioms of rational 
preferences (ie transitivity and 
completeness) 
 
Figure B
HEBP is self-interested; Social-Economic Man represents 
HEBP 
Preferences are: 
Partly or entirely exogenous and fixed, but also 
potentially endogenous, unstable and not given. 
Choices are: 
Income and price limit choices, but social preferences 
also affect choices in that HEBP's choices are in part 
determined by other HEBP's choices. Social preferences 
represent the extension strategy.   
Ranking of choices follow that: 
The ranking of choice follows the axioms of rational 
preferences (ie transitivity and completeness) 
 
Source: author of dissertation 
Differences between Figures A and B 
 
Figure B concludes that 
 
 HEBP is partly economic man 
and partly social man 
 Preferences are not exclusively 
exogenous all the time, but can 
be endogenous at times 
 Choices are not limited by 
income and price, but are also 
affected by social preferences 
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Table 2 (p.53) provides the summary of the differences between Figure 
A and Figure B within Figure 3 (p.50). To support Figure B within 
Figure 3 (p.50), empirical evidence is given to prove that the 
household energy bill payer does not only make choices that are solely 
bounded by the limitations of energy prices and income in the pursuit 
to maximise household energy conservation.  
 
In support, and to appeal to the 'social' side of Social-Economic Man 
(Figure B in Figure 3, p.50), a number of household energy 
conservation studies are discussed to show how effective peer 
pressure is on decreasing household energy consumption. 
 
Thaler and Sunstein (2008) discuss social nudges. According to Thaler 
and Sunstien a nudge is 'any aspect of the choice architecture that 
alters people's behaviour in a predictable manner' (P.6). Choice 
architecture is the responsibility for, and the organisation of, the way 
in which people make decisions. This definition neatly embraces and 
conforms to this dissertation's Social Economic Man in that the 
'aspect' of choices is partly social and economic. A nudge can be a 
formidable tool to aid policymakers. In the context of this dissertation, 
policymakers can use nudges by persuading households to reduce 
energy consumption. Nudges work by focusing on households nudging 
other households to follow their behaviour through having preferences 
that are open to persuasion, content-manipulation, and imitation.   
 
As Figure B in Figure 3 (p.50) illustrates, by combing economic man 
(ie self-interested man) and with social man (ie people's choices are 
influenced by other people's choices) provides a more robust 
explanation for how energy bill payers make choices, and the factors 
that affect the amount of electricity used in the household. Evidence 
of Thaler's and Sunstien's Social Nudges are activated by peer 
pressure, because a nudge is 'any aspect of the choice architecture 
that alters people's behaviour in a predictable manner' (P.6). The 
influence of peer pressure is found in a wide-body of literature, and 
  55 
has been proven effective in decreasing household energy 
consumption. 
How peer pressure affects household electricity consumption: 
empirical evidence to support Social-Economic Man of Figure B in 
Figure 3 (p.50)  
 
Schultz et al. (2007) explored social nudges (or peer pressure) in the 
pursuit to encourage decreases in energy use in California. A study on 
household energy consumption involving 300,000 participants who 
were provided with information on their household energy use as well 
as their neighbours' household energy use produced some interesting 
results. Households who used more energy than their neighbours 
were encouraged to decrease household energy use. However, those 
that were using less than the average increased energy use: the 
boomerang effect describes this behaviour. The former provides 
evidence of peer pressure through wanting to confirm with the 
neighbourhood. Though there is evidence for money as a motivational 
factor in decreasing household energy consumption, the choice to 
switch off lights may also partly be explained by the fact that 
neighbours switch off lights. An explanation for this behaviour is that 
Social-Economic Man has weighed up the self-interested benefits of 
saving money with the social benefit of conforming to the 
neighbourhood, and by doing so receives a 'warm glow'. When 
combined, these two factors of self-interest and receiving a warm glow 
support each other in that the subjects of the experiment want to save 
money and want to conform to the neighbours' norm of saving 
electricity. The evidence supporting this warm glow is twofold.  
Firstly, those who were using more energy made quite substantial 
reductions when they were also provided with a picture of an unhappy 
face. Secondly, those that had originally increased their household 
energy consumption because they were below the average use (ie the 
boomerang effect), immediately stopped when they received a picture 
of a happy face.    
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It appears that the 'social' side of Social-Economic Man has been 
exposed and represented in a number of different countries. Research 
in January 2010 by Accenture (2011) looked at how peer pressure 
encourages participation in electricity management programs. The 
research was based on a global survey of 17 countries with a total 
sample size of 9,108 of people. Sixty five per cent of participations 
proclaimed that the choice to participate in the management 
programme was in part dependent on others participation. Countries 
like Brazil and Italy have 92 per cent and 85 per cent participation. 
However, for counties like Germany, United Kingdom and United 
States the figures were much lower, 46 per cent, 46 per cent, and 48 
per cent. United Kingdom, Germany, and the USA are less 
enthusiastic about participating, perhaps because it was not stressed 
that money savings are achieved if participation is undertaken.   
 
OPOWER also uses peer pressure that can lead to influencing Social-
Economic Man and electricity consumption. The principle 
surrounding the philosophy of OPOWER is their belief that people 
want to feel that they fit in to the norm of electricity consumption in 
their neighbourhood. OPOWER (http://opower.com) reports data to 
customers for utility companies based on demographics. Since its 
inauguration in 2007, the company reports that it has managed to 
save over 90 million kilowatt hours of electricity. OPOWER uses data 
information on the service areas in which they operate (UK and USA) 
to run schemes that provide information on how much electricity 
communities use in their homes and then send this information to all 
neighbours. The type of schemes they use included, 'You used 72% 
more household energy than your efficient neighbours.' The 
information then provides a tip to help conserve energy, 'Most people 
in your area keep their air-conditioning at 78 degrees.' The choice of 
having the air-conditioning at 78 degrees, as opposed to a higher 
setting, is one way in which 80 per cent of the households adopted 
energy conservation measures. 
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Peer pressure was also the focus of research by Cialdini (2007). 
Cialdini undertook an experiment involving the residents of San 
Diego. The study involved placing door hangers on the doors of people 
staying in hotels once a week for a month. These hangers had one of 
four messages written on them: 
1. 'You could save money by conserving energy.' 
2. 'You could save the earth's resources by conserving energy.' 
3. 'The majority of your neighbours tried regularly to conserve 
energy - information we have learnt from a prior survey.' 
4. 'You could be socially responsible citizens by conserving energy.' 
 
Of the four messages, message number 3 was the most effective. 
Again, it is suggested that the choices of the neighbours have 
influenced the choices of others in the hotel. 
 
Pallak et al. (1980) looked at how peer pressure and publicising the 
amount of household energy used influences energy conservation in 
Iowa, USA in 1973. The study lasted for 12 months. The study 
involved representatives visiting homes in Iowa for 20 minutes to see 
whether then would sign up to participate in the research. The 
research consisted of conservation tips and the permission to 
publicise participates' names along with the results of each 
participator's conservation success or failure as measured against the 
other participator's efforts in the conservation study. When the 
household energy choices were common knowledge, the results 
showed that households, who participated in the experiment, decrease 
their household energy use by 20 per cent less electricity. Pallak et al. 
(1980) accredited this saving as peer pressure in that participates 
wanting to conform and take on energy efficient behaviour. 
Similar results on peer pressure were found when an experiment was 
undertaken in Minnesota. According to the research by OPOWER 
(2009) available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/1hi/programmes/world 
news america/8286152.stm, the participants involved in the 
experiment were provided with information on how much energy was 
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used by the other 100 participants involved in the social experiment. 
Each participant was then ranked by their energy saving performance 
efforts.  The noticeable market drop in household energy consumption 
was partly to save money, but as well as this, it was partly because 
others had chosen to use fewer energy units in the household. From 
this premise, each participant wanted to be seen as ‘doing their bit’ 
and by this, each participant was influenced by knowing how much 
others were saving in relation to what they had saved. In this 
experiment, social standing and group peer pressure have influenced 
how much household energy can be saved as measured by the drop in 
household energy consumption.   
 
Allcott (2009) also undertook research in household electricity 
consumption and peer pressure in Minnesota. A company called 
Positive Energy mailed ways in which 80,000 household energy users 
could conserve energy and compare this conservation with the 
neighbours. The findings of the experiment found that households 
undertaking the experiment reduced household energy consumption 
by 1.9 per cent. According to Allcott, this saving of 1.9 per cent was 
due to information about energy savings and competition between 
neighbours as reinforced by the social norm of wanting to compete 
with the neighbours. This competition between neighbours provides 
supplementary data that non-price nudges can considerably affect 
consumer behaviour and choices.      
 
Ayers et al. (2009) produced similar results like Allcott when they 
undertook a study on peer pressure and household electricity 
consumption in the USA between April 2008 and April 2009. 55,000 
homes received information about their electricity consumption as 
well as their neighbours' electricity household consumption. The 
average saving was 2 per cent and was attributed in part, to how the 
study groups believed other members in the study viewed them. The 
peer comparisons worked as the catalyst in reducing residential 
electricity consumption. 
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The National Grid undertook further research in America on peer 
comparisons. Witkin (2010), a writer for the New York Times, reported 
on these findings disseminated by the Northeastern States National 
Grid. The National Grid ran an experiment involving 100 people and 
their use of household energy; information of these 100 people was 
shared. What the National Grid found was that a 1 per cent drop in 
household energy use was recorded. The explanation for the drop was 
because each group member wanted to please the other group 
members and therefore made the choice of reducing and conserving 
energy consumption. National Grid suggested that peer pressure and 
monetary savings were more effective than only using monetary saving 
information, because, and despite the fact that monetary savings are 
important, by being part of the community, this community 
philosophy was valued as an integral part of being a good community 
citizen along with monetary savings. 
 
Peer comparisons were also used as an incentive for a study in the 
Boston Metropolitan area of the USA ('Energy Smackdown: Driving 
Participation through Friendly Competition', 2010). Teams were 
brought together from three neighbourhoods of Arlington, Cambridge, 
and Medford, with a total sample size of 100 households and duration 
of one year. The study involved teams competing with each other to 
reduce carbon dioxide emissions from six different areas: electricity, 
heating fuel, pounds of landfill-bound waste, air travel, car travel, and 
servings of meat. The purpose of the experiment was for the study 
groups to earn points based on particular energy saving activities. 
These energy saving activities were then recorded on-line allowing 
participants in other groups to track the progress of rival teams. The 
results of the Energy Smackdown study found that the average 
annual reduction of electricity was 14 per cent. According to the 
researchers, the results are partly due to the nature of the experiment 
insofar as the groups wanted to outperform other rival groups. This 
competitive head-to-head mentality created peer pressure and social 
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norms through formed group networks to provide and help with ideas 
in ways in which to reduce household electricity consumption. This 
group network helped to maintain reductions in household electricity 
so that overall the group has the best possible chance of winning the 
competition.      
 
Conclusion 
The Chapter began by asking the research question: 
 
Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect on 
household electricity consumption? 
 
To test whether social preferences do have any influence on household 
energy bill payers' consumption, Figure B in Figure 3 (p.50) was 
constructed to show how peer pressure (a social preference) could 
manipulate household energy consumption. To support peer pressure 
in Figure B (p.50), Loomes's (1999) £10 experiment was discussed to 
demonstrate how individual choices are partly determined by the 
choices of others. Loomes's experiment was transferred to Figure B 
(p.50).  
 
From the evidence of Loomes's experiment, Figure B in Figure 3 (p.50) 
was created. Figure B demonstrated that peer pressure can affect 
household energy bill payers choices and in some cases help to 
decrease household energy consumption. To test the hypothesis of 
Figure B (p.50) and the idea of a social preference extension strategy a 
wide body of literature was presented based on field experiments that 
found peer pressure does influence the household energy bill payer 
into changing choices. This is because many households alter their 
behaviour to conform to that of groups who want to comply with 
others in the group or simply feel that they ought to copy what others 
have done in the group. Therefore, it means that household energy bill 
payers can no longer be taken as the immovable judges of their best 
interest insofar as part of the household energy bill payer's judgement 
is influenced by the judgements of other household energy bill payers 
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judgments. By emphasising context-dependent preferences, the social 
preference extension strategy creates options where policymakers rely 
on persuasion, context-manipulation and the observation and 
imitation of other household energy bill payers to change preference 
ordering, rather than only using policies they rely exclusively on the 
changes in electricity prices and household incomes with given 
preferences.  
 
Through presenting Figure B in Figure 3 (p.50) along with the 
empirical evidence supporting Figure B, Chapter 3 concludes that 
targeting man, as a Social-Economic Man, is an effective solution to 
altering household environmental related behaviour.  
 
In chapter 4, the idea of the social preference extension strategy is 
expanded to include negative and positive cooperation along with 
negative and positive endogenous preferences, all of which are set in a 
game of two-players to gauge how effective cooperation and 
endogenous preferences are in altering choices in the purchase of low 
carbon labelled products.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
Can a Social Preference Extension Strategy help to put off 
Free Riders and Maintain a Pareto-improvement in the 
Purchase of Low Carbon Information Footprint Labelled 
Products? 
 
Introduction  
The research question of Chapter 4 brings the evidence from all the 
previous Chapters together, namely, the evidence of rational choice, 
transitivity, and completeness, and the evidence that the social 
preference extension strategy complements rational choice theory. 
This penultimate Chapter therefore seeks to find answers to research 
question 4. 
Research question 4: 
 Can a social preference extension strategy help to put off 
free riders and maintain a Pareto-improvement in the 
purchase of low carbon information footprint labelled 
products? 
 
The research objective is to design and use a repeated cooperative 
game model that provides a four-grid payoff-matrix to display the 
decisions of customers for when they decide to free ride on other 
customers' actions or not to free ride on other customers' actions. The 
Four-Grid Repetitive Game Payoff Matrix is Figure 4 (p.73). 
 
The research strategy is to test the hypothesis of research question 4. 
To do this, Figure 4 (p.73) requires breaking down into its individual 
grids. Each grid is scrutinised in terms of how it fits into the 
conventional thinking of rational choice theory and how each grid fits 
into the thinking of Social-Economic Man. Social-Economic Man is 
exposed to different situations that generate positive conditional 
cooperation or negative conditional cooperation as well as positive 
endogenous preferences or negative endogenous preferences. 
 
The research then theoretically justifies and explains how endogenous 
social preferences can transform the Four Grid Repetitive Game Payoff 
Matrix (Figure 4, p.73) so that the cooperative solution (ie to both 
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agree not to free ride) becomes a Pareto-improvement. Pareto-
optimality occurs when consumer A takes the best possible action for 
the environment as long as customer B takes the same action (ie 
neither free ride on the other's efforts). Actions of this nature are 
taken on the sole premise that this was the agreed action.  
 
Argued next in this Chapter is that the Pareto-improvement is 
sustainable insofar as it calls upon each customer to respond 
rationally to the possible danger that other customers may impose 
punishment on them if they were to violate the agreement not to free 
ride. This voluntary understanding allows for the agreement between 
the different parties not defaulting to the non-cooperative action that 
leads to the dominant Nash equilibrium of free riding. The non-
cooperative dominant Nash equilibrium is the best solution for each 
player irrespective of what the other player does in that each customer 
is unable to be made worse off by the actions of the other player if that 
player is already free riding. 'Worst off' refers to the effort of the player 
not to free ride (eg actively seeking the purchase of CO2 footprint 
labelled products). This non-cooperative dominant Nash equilibrium 
strategy does not represent the best outcome for the environment in 
that CO2 increases if both players were to free ride. It only provides 
the best outcome for the players in terms of receiving the benefits but 
not helping to prevent the costs. In the Pareto-improvement, this is 
not true, because collective agreements support the spirit of not 
wanting to free ride on other members of the group. This spirit of not 
wanting to free ride supports the objective of maximising the decrease 
in CO2 from all players. 
 
Finally, the theoretical analyses within each grid are then tested 
against the empirical evidence. In terms of the empirical evidence, 
what is important is proving or disproving the 'concept' of mutual 
context-dependency that supports the Nash dominant equilibrium 
strategy and the mutual context-dependency that supports the Pareto-
improvement. Since research question 4 is targeted at the individual 
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and not the situation in which these individuals find themselves, then 
if mutual context-dependency is validated, it can, therefore, be applied 
to situations for when free riders are, or are not, present in the 
purchase of carbon labelled products.  
 
Given carbon labels are used in The Four-Grid Repetitive Game Payoff 
Matrix (Figure 4, p.73); I provide a brief discussion on the background 
of carbon footprint labelled products. 
 
A brief background on Carbon labelled footprint products 
 
The story behind carbon labelling has its affiliations with PAS 
2050:2008. PAS stands for ‘Public Available Specification’. The 
development of PAS was to quantify the emissions of greenhouse 
gases during a product’s life cycle. PAS was assembled around the 
research carried out by an independent Steering Group by means of 
appointed research methodologies that measured a product’s carbon 
emissions. The research took 16 months to complete between June 
2007 and October 2009, and was funded by the Carbon Trust and the 
Department for Environment Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). The 
Steering Group’s research methodologies were facilitated by the 
cooperation of the Carbon Trust, DEFRA and the British Standard 
Institution (BSI) along with some of the biggest household high street 
names: Walkers (crisps); Boots (shampoo) and Innocent Drinks (fruit 
smoothies) (BBC News, 2007). PAS is informing the public about a 
product’s carbon footprint, defined as, 
The term ‘product carbon footprint’ refers to the greenhouse gas 
emissions of a product across its life cycle, from raw materials 
through production (or service provision), distribution, 
consumer use and disposal/recycling. (Guide to PAS, 2008, p.2) 
 
The Carbon Trust and DEFRA supported the BSI to design a label that 
provides specific details of a product’s carbon footprint. Based on the 
collaboration between the Carbon Trust, DEFRA, and the BSI, PAS 
2050:2008 came into effect in October 2008. PAS 2050:2008 
embodies a product’s carbon footprint emissions. These emissions are 
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illustrated and disseminated through information provided on the UK 
Carbon Trust’s Carbon Label.  
 
With the brief history of carbon footprint labels in place, is there any 
empirical evidence to support consumers' willingness to purchase 
products that have carbon footprint information?  
 
Pro-environmental behaviour towards purchasing low carbon labelled 
products: evidence in the literature of the willingness to purchase low 
carbon labelled products 
 
This section provides the rationale to use carbon labelling as a method 
of analysing environmental related behaviour that forms the bases of 
the Four-Grid Repetitive Game Payoff Matrix (Figure 4, p.73). What 
follows is a literature review of evidence that proves consumers have 
an open mind and a willingness to purchase low carbon labelled 
products.  
 
DEFRA found that behavioural change is evident in areas of recycling. 
Statistical evidenced of behavioural change in recycling and food 
waste is encouraging. 91 per cent of the UK population now actively 
seek to recycle. 88 per cent also consciously think about how much 
food they waste and actively participate in bringing their food waste 
down.  
 
Carbon Trust (2008) did research on carbon labelling by seeking the 
opinions of UK consumers. Their survey found 67% of UK consumers 
agreed that they are ‘more likely to buy a product with a low carbon 
footprint’ (p.28). Regarding consumer preferences towards low carbon 
products, the research found that ‘44% would switch to a product 
with a small carbon footprint even if it were not their first preference’ 
(p.28). 20% of consumers declared that they ‘would even travel to a 
less convenient retailer in order to obtain such products’ (p.28). 
 
Tesco surveyed 874 shoppers in August 2008 and found that ‘97% of 
consumers would actively seek to purchase products with a low 
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carbon footprint if they were as cheap and convenient’ (Carbon Trust, 
2008, p.28). Tesco also found that ‘35% would buy lower-carbon 
products even with a cost/convenient trade-off’ (Carbon Trust, 2008, 
P.28). 
  
Research commissioned by the LEK (2007), based on online interviews 
with UK consumers and a sample size of 2,039, provided further 
results on public opinion of low carbon footprint labels. In support of 
a change in behaviour towards the purchase of more environmentally 
friendly products, 37% of respondents believe that they are largely 
responsible for their own individual carbon footprint, but the survey 
also found that 36% of consumers further believe that manufactures 
and producers are almost as equally responsible for their [consumers] 
carbon footprint. When the sample were asked (p.2), ‘In the future, 
who should take the biggest role in minimising the carbon footprint of 
the products and services you buy?' Approximately, 38% of consumers 
believe that the manufactures and producers should take the lead in 
this responsibility. The literature on pro-environmental behaviour is 
clear in that customers are willing or are interested in purchasing 
products that have carbon labels. However, information requires the 
need to be clear so that customers have all the facts on carbon 
labelling.  
 
Carbon labelling on products 
Carbon labelling on products does appear to influence the purchasing 
decisions of consumers where ‘49% of consumers believe it makes me 
more likely to buy their products when the label is displayed on 
packs’. When consumers believe suppliers are working towards 
maintaining a sustainable environment, 65% are ‘more likely to 
purchase a product’. Support for the use of the ‘absolute numbers’ 
format was also quite high with 72% believing that displaying actual 
number of grams of carbon per product on a carbon footprint label is 
important. Favourite brands are also important to consumers in that 
86% of consumers want favourite brand names 'to help combat the 
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threat of climate change by reducing their carbon footprint' (Carbon 
Trust, 2010). 
 
LEK (2007) found that product information is also important when 
consumers are making decisions in that 56% of the sample declared 
that carbon labels on packaging is an incentive in persuading 
customers to purchase low carbon footprint products. 
 
Between the 12th and 21th of November 2007, a Populus (populus is 
Latin for ‘people’) study in three major UK cities Birmingham, Leeds, 
and London was undertaken. The focus of the research was to engage 
the UK’s public opinion on how effective information on low carbon 
footprint labelled products displayed on packaging is. The research 
was based on 6 focus groups, all of whom shopped at main 
supermarkets (Upham and Bleda, 2009). The research study found 
strong evidence against consumers paying higher prices for products 
that claimed to have low carbon reduction methodologies. The 
research study further found that consumers want clear and simple 
labelling, and for the information to be stamped on the front of the 
packing, rather than the back. Consumers appeared to be interested 
in, and in the support of, the traffic lights format, that presents how 
carbon footprint information is displayed on packaging. Too much 
information displayed on the carbon label meant the majority of the 
information came over as confusing; this resulted in its 
misinterpretation leading to ignorance of the issues. Though low 
carbon footprint labels convey messages, these messages can lead to 
confusion surrounding these carbon labels.  
 
It must be noted, therefore, that carbon labels are of limited value in 
the struggle against climate change unless the public appreciates why 
reductions in greenhouse gases are necessary in the mitigation of 
climate change. To help support the awareness of carbon labels, UK 
government campaigns include the advertisements ‘Are You Doing 
Your Bit'? and ‘Going for Green’. The aim of these advertisements is to 
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help change attitudes towards climate change. According to a DEFRA 
(2009) home face-to-face UK study of 2009 people on the people's 
attitudes to climate change, 61 per cent surveyed are aware of climate 
change. 21 per cent say it is too far in the future to spend time 
worrying about it now. 48 per cent of the UK residents are convinced 
that their lifestyles are in some way affecting climate change. 
Statistically, the most significant concern was about household energy 
use. Energy use is reputedly to be the most dominant concern in the 
struggle to combat climate change: the survey found that 85 per cent 
agreed. Energy reductions are, however, evident with 76 per cent of 
UK households using less electricity in their households (DEFRA, 
2009). 
 
Though the empirical evidence does suggest that customers are 
interested in purchasing low carbon footprint labelled products, 
empirical evidence suggesting pro-environmental behavioural 
commitment is often at conflict with actual environmental behavioural 
commitment. The divergence between the two may be explained by the 
value-action-gap. What causes this divergence is the interest of the 
next section.  
 
The value-action-gap 
Rational action is instrumentally important and explains choice 
behaviour under certain conditions of self-interest in market 
transactions. According to the FSA (2007), grocery shoppers are 
abiding to, and acting upon, the rational choice theory model by 
considering price and value as the main choice indicators when 
purchasing groceries. However, if price was the pinnacle of choice, 
then rational choice theory ought to remove the value-action-gap, but 
it fails to do this. Therefore, the rational choice model fails to 
understand the wider reasons for explaining why the gap is not 
eradicated or more plausibly decreased. To help to decrease the gap, 
Blake (1999) emphasised that individuals are influenced by other 
factors as well as price. Blake suggests that institutions and 
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community participation help form the conciliation of community 
partnerships (eg peer pressure and social norms) that help to form 
consumer choices and close the gap between proposed behaviour and 
actual behaviour.  
Wider research into the causes of the value-action-gap has provided 
some interesting insights into the nature of proposed behaviour 
versus actual behaviour. Literature from the fields of social psychology 
suggests that the gap is partly determined through consumer basic 
values (Stern and Dietz, 1994 and Johnson et al., 2004). Basic values 
are the elemental values that channel more precise values and 
consumer behaviour (McFarlane and Boxall, 2003). Therefore, 
consumer values become in violation of direct competition with 
consumers when wishing to purchase low carbon labelled products. 
 
Working alongside consumer values are beliefs. Environmental pro-
behaviour relies significantly on beliefs insofar as beliefs are what 
consumers hold to be factual (Vaske et al., 2001) and allow for the 
prioritisation of behavioural choice. Beliefs are altered by the ways in 
which consumers interpret the contribution of purchasing low carbon 
labelled products have on the atmosphere through the dissemination 
of information upon which choices are made.  
 
Information plays, therefore, an integral part in the choice process, 
because individuals want to know they have made the right choice. 
Holdsworth (2003) found a distinct lack of information increases the 
value-action-gap, because consumers are unsure whether their 
choices are benefiting the environment or simply making no 
distinctive difference to it. In addition, consumers often interpret 
environmental information in completely different ways (eg we have 
little impact on the environment, to we have significant impact on the 
environment) (Myers and Macnaghten, 1998). Interesting research to 
help bridge the value-action-gap or even eliminate this gap created by 
too confusing or too much information over available choice is the idea 
of 'choice editing' coined by the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable.  
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According to the Sustainable Consumption Roundtable (2006), choice 
editing is simply 'pre-selecting the particular range of products and 
services available to consumers' (p.63), or simply restricting consumer 
choice (Sigman, 2004). If suppliers were to come together and form 
alliances, and to agree to supply only products that are of low carbon 
emissions, then information about the effects of purchasing high or 
middle carbon emissions products would not be required. Though 
short-term costs would, increase, with economies of scale, these costs 
would decrease over time. Although according to Holdsworth (2003), 
income has an impact on widening the value-action-gap and any 
increases in the price of low carbon products would increase this gap 
temporally until the economics of scale redistribute the price to its 
former level. Any action that involves costs or exclusion of choice 
requires monitoring carefully, because the exclusion may create an 
unfair advantage. 
  
Perhaps at the very heart of the causes that create the value-action-
gap, is the theory of reasoned action (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980) which 
is 'based on the assumption that humans are usually quite rational 
and make systematic use of the information available to them' (p.5).  
 
Figure 4 (p.73) provides theoretical analyses using game theory for 
how peer pressure and social norms help to explain and support the 
purchase of products which have low carbon labels. By purchasing 
low carbon products, this helps to maintain, rather increase, CO2 
levels present in the atmosphere. However, before these analyses, and 
to help with these analyses, the basic idea of the common pool 
resource is introduced to the reader.  
 
Common pool resources  
The Figure presented in this chapter, Figure 4 (p.73), uses the concept 
of common pool resources. The relationship between Figure 4 and 
common poll resource is that the atmosphere has finite benefits. 
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Finite benefits, because as more CO2 is present in it, changes to the 
climate occur such as severe weather or rising sea levels. Therefore, as 
one country exploits the benefits of production, but at the same time 
pollutes the atmosphere, this action removes benefits for other 
countries, as a rise in CO2 in the atmosphere may lead to an increase 
in severe weather. Therefore, when benefits are finite they are often 
labelled as common pool resources that have rival properties, but are 
non-excludable (Blomquist and Ostrom, 1985 and Randall, 1983). 
Rivalry comes from using the atmosphere as a CO2 dumping ground 
that results in diminishing benefits for other ecosystems. Common 
pool resources are also defined by their non-excludability because the 
atmosphere is everywhere and is available for use without restriction; 
however, pollution polices help to restrict the amount of pollution that 
is emitted into the atmosphere.      
With an explanation of common pool resources in place, the 
fundamental characteristics of the game can be formed. Here we can 
create a Four-Grid Repetitive Payoff Matrix Model to answer the 
research question proposed at the beginning of this Chapter. 
Research question 4 
Can a social preference extension strategy help to put off free 
riders and maintain a Pareto-improvement in the purchase of 
low carbon information footprint labelled products? 
 
Figure 4 (p.73) provides the theoretical reasoning underpinning and 
supporting how the social preference extension strategy could help to 
maintain a Pareto-improvement. Figure 4 (p.73) assumes some rules, 
and these rules are: 
 The model is essentially closed. Social norms and peer pressure 
are affected by decisions from inside the model. For peer 
pressure and social norms to change over time, it requires each 
person to collectively agree to accept different social norms and 
peer pressure that are activated by external influences over 
which they have no control, but do have control over whether 
they choose to accept them or not as part of the ethos of the 
group. 
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 In small groups, customers are able to form voluntary 
agreements (ie not governed by acts of law). 
 In large groups, customers are not able to form voluntary 
agreements, because these customers cannot communicate with 
all members of the group. 
 Free riders are a possibility. 
 A Pareto-improvement may lead to a better payoff for customers. 
 Games are played more than once. 
 Climate change is a global public good, and the effort to 
purchase low footprint products helps to support fewer CO2 
emissions present in the atmosphere. 
 Communication is allowed between customers, and can happen 
more than once. 
The strategies open to the customers are: 
 Free ride. 
 Not free ride. 
The payoffs from these strategies are: 
 Customer 1 purchases low carbon footprint labelled 
products, and customer 2 does not, then overall CO2 present 
in the atmosphere decreases. 
 Customer 2 purchases low carbon footprint labelled 
products, and customer 1 does not, then overall CO2 present 
in the atmosphere decreases. 
 Both customers do not purchase low carbon footprint 
labelled products, then overall CO2 present in the 
atmosphere increases. 
 Customer 1 and 2 purchase low carbon footprint labelled 
products, then overall CO2 present in the atmosphere 
decreases. 
Figure 4 is presented below on page 73. 
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Figure 4: Four-grid repetitive game payoff matrix 
 
                      Customer 2 
 
 
Customer 1 
                                                                Product                                          Product 
                                                                 with CO2 Label                           without CO2 Label             
                                                                    
 
                 
                      Product 
                with CO2 Label                     
                     
 
 
             
                      Product         
             without CO2 Label             
 
                     not free ride                              Free ride   
 
not free ride                             not free ride                         
                      
 
                 not free ride 
                                                                       Free ride                                
  
Free ride                                    Free ride  
Source: adapted from Parkin, Powell, and Matthews (1997, p.232) 
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Figure 4 (p.73) is not a one-shot game in that interaction between customers 
happens more than once. Figure 4 (p.73) does not assume that customers 
cannot communicate information between each other. Figure 4 (p.73) uses 
'to communicate cooperatively' to help to promote and create the best payoff 
between Customer 1 and Customer 2. 
To support the use of cooperative communication in Figure 4 (p.73), 
research by Dawes et al (1977) found that in circumstances of no 
cooperative communication the desire to free ride was 73%, in 
circumstances of irrelevant communication, free riding was 65%. When 
communication was relevant and effective, free riding was 26%. Another 
empirical study by Chaudhuri et al. (2006) supports Dawes findings.  
Chaudhuri et al. (2006) examined how information helps to support a better 
payoff. The game had 10 rounds in groups of 5, each person having 10 
tokens each. The communication took place via three different mediums. 
Firstly, private knowledge occurs when information is passed to one other 
person. Secondly, public knowledge occurs when information is available to 
all members of the group. Thirdly, common knowledge occurs when 
information is available to all members of the group, but read aloud. In 
terms of the common knowledge scheme, contributions to the public 
account were around 90%. According to Chaudhuri et al. (2006), this high 
percentage of contributions to the public account was because information 
flow creates confident beliefs in that the majority of people contributed to 
the public account. Figure 4 (p.73) uses certain types of information that 
provides explanations for why certain payoffs take place, based on whether 
payoffs are self-enforcing or enforceable. To explain this information, Figure 
5 (p.75) separately defines key phrases. 
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Figure 5: Different types of information used to convey different choice options available to Customer 1 and 2 
Phrase 
   
Meaning      
      
Positive endogenous preferences 
These occur when Person A's choice is based on Person B's choice 
and both choices result in a higher payoff for the group, 
    
for example, when both persons agree to reduce CO2. 
 
      
           
           
Negative endogenous preferences 
These occur when Person A's choice is based on Person B's choice 
and both choices result in a lower payoff for the group,  
    
for example, when person A finds out that person B is free 
riding and copies this choice.  
 
    
  
 
         
           
Positive conditional cooperation 
This occurs when both persons have enforceable cooperation and the 
outcome of this cooperation results in a higher payoff for the group, 
for example, when both persons agree to reduce CO2, and  
    
this agreement is enforceable within small groups. 
     
      
        
           
Negative conditional cooperation 
This occurs when both persons have unenforceable cooperation and 
the outcome of this cooperation results in a lower payoff for the 
group, for example, each person believes the other is free riding so 
they too free ride 
     
      
     
According to Chaudhuri (2007, p.5) 
'Conditional cooperation is defined as 
one whose contribution to the public 
good is positively correlated with his 
belief about the contributions to be made 
by other group members.' 
 
Source: based on the ideas of Rabin (1993); Guth et al. (1982); Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)  
 
  76 
Supporting the information in Figure 5 (p.75) are the different types of 
strategies that explain people's choices. A Distributional Concern Model 
supports the theories of negative endogenous preferences and negative 
conditional cooperation. A Distributional Concern Model looks at how the 
distribution is shared and the potential free riding on this distribution that 
leads to more free riding (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000). A Distributional Concern Model is represented as the strategy 
situated in the lower right hand quadrant of Figure 4 (p.73).  
The other strategy represented in Figure 4 (p.73) is based on an Intention-
Based Model that focuses on the distribution that promotes cooperation and 
the desire to reciprocate that cooperation (Rabin, 1993; Guth et al., 1982; 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 2004). An Intention-Based Model supports the 
theories of positive endogenous preferences and positive conditional 
cooperation and is represented as the strategy situated in the top left hand 
quadrant of Figure 4 (p.73). The bottom left hand side and the top right 
hand side quadrants of Figure 4 (p.73) are somewhere in-between the both 
models. What follows is a theoretical discussion explaining the different 
choice payoffs (or outcomes) as measured by the actions of Customer 1 and 
Customer 2 that are represented in each of the quadrants in Figure 4 (p.73). 
In Figure 4 (p.73), the payoffs shown in Purple are the first under 
discussion.  
Customer 1 purchases low carbon footprint labelled products, and customer 
2 does not; or customer 2 purchases low carbon footprint labelled products, 
and customer 1 does not 
Customer 1 purchases whilst Customer 2 does not purchase low carbon 
footprint labelled products or Customer 2 purchases whilst Customer 1 does 
not purchase. In Figure 4 (p.73), the payoff choice to purchase is to nott   ff rr ee  
rr ii de and the payoff not to purchase is to   ff rr ee  rr ii de. Rational choice theory 
explains either of these choices. Customer 1 has self-interest, pure 
rationality (ie choices are based on fixed and unmoveable individual 
preferences) and perfect information (ie Customer 1 knows that Customer 2 
shall purchase or not purchase low carbon footprint labelled products). 
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Customer 1 ranks all preferences and selects the one that provides the 
greatest utility for Customer 1. Furthermore, Customer 1 does not care 
about whether other customers do, or do not, purchase low carbon footprint 
products. Customer 1 rationalises that purchasing this product provides a 
net benefit for Customer 1, regardless of what Customer 2 chooses to do. 
Rational choice theory does not provide the best payoff for the group insofar 
as CO2 is increasing, in part, if Customer 2 does not purchase low carbon 
footprint products. Rational choice theory also makes Customer 1 worse off 
overall in relation to Customer 1's own self-interested agenda. Customer 1 is 
worse off because of all those customers not purchasing low carbon 
footprint products increases CO2 for the non-purchasers as well as for 
Customer 1. The group is worse off, and self-interest fails to provide the best 
outcome for the group.         
 
When Customers 1 and 2 serve only themselves, this always provides the 
worst outcome for the group. A possible weakness of rational choice theory 
is that social preferences are not used. Social preferences provide the 
opportunity to do what is best for each customer and the group by making 
preferences context-dependent, and this context-dependency affects 
consumer choices that may or may not result in better payoffs for both 
Customer 1 and 2. This leads the discussions to the lower right hand 
quadrant of Figure 4 (p.73).           
Theoretical analyses for mutual context-dependency supporting the Nash 
dominant equilibrium strategy: the case for free riding 
In Figure 4 (p.73), the payoff not to purchase carbon footprint labelled 
products is to   ff rr ee  rr ii de. It is the lower right hand quadrant of Figure 4 
(p.73). This is the dominant Nash equilibrium. 
Characteristics of this option are: 
 The choice not to purchase CO2 footprint labelled products is 
assumed mutually context-dependent. 
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 Unenforceable contracts are present in that there are too many 
customers to check whether all are participating in the purchase of 
CO2 labelled footprint products. 
 Social preferences and social norms support negative conditional 
cooperation and negative endogenous preferences. 
The lower right hand quadrant in Figure 4 (p.73) shows that both Customer 
1 and 2 are contributing to the increase of CO2 present in the atmosphere. 
This payoff shows that rational choice theory leads to both Customers 
receiving a worst payoff in relation to their own self-interested agendas. It is 
a worst payoff in that both Customers could purchase low carbon footprint 
products, but have chosen not to. It is a worst payoff because one of the 
Customers could have chosen to purchase low carbon footprint labelled 
products, providing an overall net social benefit that non-purchasers shall 
benefit. The payoff arises because both Customers believe that they are 
being taken advantage of by the other Customer's choice. Each Customer 
views the other customer as a free rider. Free riding is getting the benefit of 
a good (in this case a more sustainable climate) without paying for it, or 
making an effort to support a more sustainable climate by helping to 
decrease CO2 present in the atmosphere through purchasing low carbon 
footprint labelled products. 
If many customers were represented in Figure 4 (p.73), then these 
customers would assume free riders are present, because customers cannot 
prove or enforce contracts to all customers that they are not one of these 
free riders. Customers are unable to communicate with the entire 
population to form agreements to the effect of not wanting to free ride. This 
weak communication creates inability to prove they are not free riding, 
therefore, creating negative conditional cooperation. Negative conditional 
cooperation occurs when social norms support conditional cooperation but 
in a negative way. According to Cialdini and Trost (1998, p.152), 'Social 
norms are rules and standards that are understood by members of a group, 
and that guide and/or constrain social behaviour without the force of laws.'  
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In this case, constrain is negative in that payoffs are self-enforced; 
customers' choices are presented as purchasing low carbon footprint 
labelled products. The problem with this 'presenting' is that customers 
proclaiming they are not free riders are not trusted, and this lack of trust, 
along with many customers, acts as a block in preventing conditional 
cooperation to get the best payoff for each customer and for the group. If 
taken in the context of not wanting to be a victim of a free rider, negative 
conditional cooperation represents the Nash dominant equilibrium strategy 
in that regardless of what the other customers do; Customer 1 does not 
purchase a low carbon footprint product. By not purchasing a low carbon 
footprint labelled product, Customer 1 is not a victim of free riders, for 
Customer 1 is a free rider himself. The social norm 'not to cooperate' drives 
more customers to free ride. 
In Figure 4 (p.73), the inclusion of free riders is the difference between the 
Purr pll e payoff and the Red payoff. With the Purr pll e payoff, Customer 1 did 
not care about what Customer 2 chose. Nevertheless, add the thought of the 
possibility of free riders to the game, this addition changes choice. Before, 
Customer 1 thought that he was achieving a net benefit for himself, at a cost 
to himself in the form of the price of a low carbon footprint product and the 
effort to learn about climate change. But now Customer 1 thinks that the 
additional disadvantages of free riders, the price of the product and the 
effort to learn about climate change, takes too much of a liberty of Customer 
1s' good nature. 
Furthermore, the presence of free riding has the ability to block customers 
from wanting to cooperate with each other over the long-term. This negative 
non-conformity with others is because once free riding becomes the social 
norm, behaviour to free ride is circular and continuously maintained by the 
presence of negative conditional cooperation, supporting the worst payoff in 
terms of collectively, and of their own individual self-interested agendas. 
Figure 6 (p.80) illustrates and summarises this circular negative conditional 
cooperation choice pattern. 
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Customer 1  is, and suspects 
others to be ,free riders, but 
cannot confirm because of the 
large group which Customer 1 is a 
part. 
Suspicion of free riders in the 
group leads to negative 
conditional cooperation with self-
enforcing payoffs (Gachter, 2007 
and Fischacher and Gachter, 
2006). 
Negative conditional 
cooperation increases 
through the group 
because it is a 
function of negative 
endogenous 
preferences (ie if 
others are defecting 
then why should 
Customer 1 not 
defect?) (Dawes and 
Thaler 1988; Ledyard 
1995). 
Social norms support 
negative endogenous 
preferences  (Coleman, 
1990 and Elster 1989). 
Negative conditional 
cooperation, negative 
endogenous preferences 
and social norms enforce 
the will to continue to free 
ride. 
                        Figure 6: Free riding and continuous circular negative 
                                                 conditional cooperation 
 
Source: author of dissertation 
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To break the negative conditional cooperation cycle shown in Figure 6 (p.80) 
requires reframing cooperation so that cooperation is represented as positive 
as opposed to negative. This leads the discussion to the final quadrant, the 
quadrant on the top left hand side in Figure 4 (p.73). 
Theoretical analyses for mutual context-dependency supporting the Pareto-
improvement strategy: the case of not wanting to free ride 
The payoff to purchase carbon footprint products is to   nott   ff rr ee  rr ii de. It is 
the top left hand quadrant of Figure 4 (p.73). This option represents the 
Pareto-improvement. 
Characteristics of this option are: 
 Reciprocated or mutual context-dependency assumed. 
 Enforceable contracts are present. Although the game is mutually 
context-dependent, this mutual context-dependency is enforceable in 
that an agreement is made between small local communities, and if 
this agreement is breached it becomes enforceable by exposing the 
individual to the rest of the group as a free rider. 
 As previously discussed on pages 52-57, tension between 
social/community values and individual rationality in small local 
groups is dealt with by using social norms (ie wanting to conform to 
the group: collective rationality) and peer pressure (ie not wanting to 
be exposed as a nonconformists). 
 Positive conditional cooperation and positive endogenous preferences 
are represented and are supported by social preferences and social 
norms. 
In the last section, free riders created negative conditional cooperation and 
negative endogenous preferences, and that the bottom right hand quadrant 
of Figure 4 (p.73) is the Nash dominant equilibrium strategy in that the best 
option for both players was to free ride. By free riding, each player cannot be 
made worse off, despite what the other player decides to do. In Figure 4 
(p.73), the Nash dominant strategy is the default strategy under the frame of 
non-cooperative behaviour. However, is it possible for the social preference 
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extension strategy to persuade both Customer 1 and 2 not to default to the 
dominant strategy? For the dominant strategy is not the best outcome for 
the environment in that CO2 increases in both cases given that each 
Customer adds more CO2 to the atmosphere. 
To persuade customers to purchase carbon footprint labelled products, it 
requires both Customer1 and Customer 2 to view collective action in a 
positive way in the hope to create a Pareto-improvement. A Pareto-
improvement occurs when one person in a community is better off without 
anyone else becoming worse off. The Pareto-improvement considers only the 
CO2 emissions in the atmosphere. The Pareto-improvement happens when 
Customer 1 takes the best possible action for the environment as long as 
Customer 2 takes the same action (ie neither free ride on the other's efforts). 
Therefore, the action of each customer benefits themselves, but at the same 
time, makes no other person worse off. Given that only CO2 emissions are 
considered, Pareto-optimality is not applicable. For the outcome to be 
Pareto-optimum, one person is made better off whilst another is made worse 
off. However, if only CO2 emissions are considered, then purchasing carbon 
labelled products does not make any other person worse off, because CO2 
has decreased for the purchaser as well as the community. Actions of this 
nature are taken on the sole premise that this was the agreed action. The 
reasoning behind this type of equilibrium is that this Pareto-improvement 
calls upon each customer to respond rationally to the believable danger of 
the other customer's willingness to impose punishment if the agreement is 
breached. From this premise, of not wanting to run the risk of being 
exposed, as a free rider, it requires 'significance' placed on each player in 
terms of their actions either to purchase, or not to purchase, CO2 labelled 
products. 
This placement of significance falls under the headings of positive 
conditional cooperation and positive endogenous preferences, and are 
effective if used with social norms. The social norm 'to cooperate' acts as a 
social preference and forms part of the social preference extension strategy, 
because both Customer 1 and 2 know that the other customer shall expose 
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them as untrustworthy if they were to default on the agreement between 
them and free ride. Therefore, both Customer 1 and 2 shall not run the risk 
of being exposed as free riding. The social preference extension strategy is in 
effect, because social preferences are being used such as reciprocity of trust. 
Positive endogenous preferences are also at work in that the choice not to 
free ride is context-dependent on the other customer's choice not to free 
ride. The outcome is that CO2 is decreased by the actions of both 
customers, and this decrease in CO2 supports positive conditional 
cooperation in that the overall benefit for both customers is at its highest. It 
is at its highest because both customers benefit from what the other is doing 
either individually or collectively in terms of personal satisfaction (ie being 
trustworthy), and for the environment (ie both decreasing CO2 present in 
the atmosphere).    
Figure 7 (p.84) summarises how the Pareto-improvement works, and how it 
is maintained in the pursuit of helping to persuade both customers not to 
default to the dominant strategy and both become free riders.  
  
  84 
 
  
                                          Figure 7: Pareto-improvement: 
                                 the removal of free riders from small groups 
 
1. Customer 1 suspects free riders, 
but cannot confirm because of the 
large group that Customer 1 is a 
part. 
 
2.  Local communities come together to 
form agreements not to free ride on the 
benefits of others in local communities 
(Teisl et al 2007 and Allison and 
Messick 1990). 
 
3. A Pareto-improvement is driven by 
the presence of social preferences that 
support positive conditional cooperation 
and positive endogenous preferences (ie 
if others are cooperating then I 
reciprocate that cooperation) (Guth, 
1982 and Rabin 1993). 
 
4. The Pareto-improvement 
is maintained by social 
preferences in the form of a 
social agreement not to free 
ride with the threat of 
punishment if the social 
agreement is broken by one 
or more members of the 
group, eg to be exposed as 
untrustworthy (Coleman, 
1990 and Elster 1989). 
 
5. Free riders are removed 
within small local 
communities; thereby from 
herein the first step is 
bypassed.   
Source: author of dissertation 
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Figure 4 (p.73) paints a picture of either Customer 1 and 2 defaulting and 
free riding or forming a collective agreement with the help of social norms 
and social preferences in an effort to work together to reduce CO2 present in 
the atmosphere. To test the hypothesis of Figure 4 (p.73), what follows are 
empirical findings that provide evidence for both cases: either to free ride 
(and therefore support the Nash dominant equilibrium strategy) or not to 
free ride (and therefore support the Pareto-improvement strategy). 
Empirical evidence  
 
Empirical evidence for mutual context-dependency supporting the Nash 
dominant equilibrium strategy: the case-supporting no in that individuals 
want to free ride 
 
Gachter (2006) explains that free riding on public goods is because of the 
fragility of conditional cooperation. According to Gachter (2006, p.2), 
'Conditional co-operators, who experience free riding, will stop cooperating 
themselves.' Furthermore, Gachter (2006, p.3) explains that, 'There exist 
social interaction effects in voluntary cooperation.' Therefore, my 
interpretation of Gachter's argument is that if the voluntary social norm is 
against cooperating, then the individual shall 'adapt their behaviour to the 
respective group they are in' (p.3). 
 
Fischbacher and Gachter (2006) and Fischbacher et al. (2001) developed two 
similar experiments that validate Gachter's (2006) free rider claim. For the 
2001 experiment, 44 players were involved, and were divided into groups of 
4. The game was played only once, ie a one-shot game. Throughout the 
game, the players could not communicate with each other. Each player had 
20 tokens, which were redeemable at the end of the game as money. The 
players had to make two choices: an unconditional choice and a conditional 
choice. The unconditional choice asked each player to state how many 
tokens he or she is willing to put in the public account, based on not 
knowing what the other players' contributions might be. The second choice 
was conditional. Each player had to state how many tokens he or she would 
give to the public account based on the average group tokens given. 
Communication for this choice was also not permitted. The payoff for each 
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player is the money each player put into his or her private account plus a 
share of the public account. The average contribution could be 20 tokens for 
the group, and from this assumption, each player places a figure on how 
many tokens he or she would give to the public account if this assumption 
were to be true. When a person is randomly selected, it is this amount that 
goes into the public account, eg if a person puts 0 tokens against the 
average of 20 tokens, then 0 tokens would go into the public account. The 
results found that 50% of players are conditional co-operators. This is 
because for some players the temptation to free ride is more attractive when 
each player can make a judgement on what the other player might prefer to 
do. Based on this assumption, this partially free riding player can achieve 
higher contributions, netting a higher payoff than the other players do, by 
giving less rather than more to the public account.  
 
The second experiment is Fischbacher and Gachter 2006 experiment. This 
experiment is similar to the circumstances represented in Figure 4 (p.73) in 
that this experiment was not a one-shot game, because the game was played 
10 times. The players have to state what they would pay into the public 
account based on their belief of what they believed the other players would 
contribute to the public account. The results found that actual 
contributions fell in correlation to the derived belief contributions, because 
the games are played more than once. Therefore, time becomes an important 
influence in this game insofar as social norms over time allow the players to 
believe that the other players shall try to free ride the more times the game 
is played. The social norm states that the norm is to free ride as time 
progresses. This is a negative choice, for it is the choice to free ride on 
other's generosity. Furthermore, negative endogenous preferences are at 
work here, because the belief preference to free ride is context-dependent on 
the belief preference that other players are also free riding and shall 
contribute less to the public account. Negative endogenous preferences have 
(supported by social norms) led to a peer effect (Manski, 2000). Choice has 
changed as a function of context-dependent preferences (ie choice is based 
on the choice of others), making preferences endogenous. 
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Furthermore, Dawes and Thaler (1988) and Ledyard (1995) give support for 
the breakdown of conditional cooperation. They argue that conditional 
cooperation is hardly ever achievable in finitely recurring public games with 
self-enforced anonymous interactions. Gardner and Stern, 2002 and Stern 
(1992) found that when more effort is required along with rising costs 
cooperation decreases.  
 
On balance, so far, the discussion has focused on the outcomes that provide 
negative conditional cooperation, being that if Customer 1 free rides, then so 
shall Customer 2 free ride (Figure 4, p.73). The explanations for this were 
because of negative endogenous preferences that support the social norm 
not to cooperate. Because Customer 1 and 2 thought, it was unfair for either 
to free ride so they too decided to free ride. Whereas Fischbacher et al. 
(2001) explained the reasons why negative conditional cooperation occurs, 
the fact remains that 50% (of the 2001 research findings) were categorized 
as positive conditional co-operators. In other words, these positive 
conditional co-operators are willing not to free ride as long as others in the 
group do not free ride either. This willingness to cooperate supports the 
Pareto-improvement strategy and the use of the social preference extension 
strategy. Empirical evidence to support the social preference extension 
strategy is discussed below.     
Empirical evidence for mutual context-dependency supporting the Pareto-
improvement strategy: the case supporting yes in that individuals do not 
want to free ride on other individuals 
 
To encourage customers not to free ride when in small groups, I suggest 
using positive endogenous preferences, positive conditional cooperation, and 
social norms to show the willingness to cooperate as a group, group loyalty, 
and group reciprocity of choices. The idea that choices might be described 
as 'positive' is from the idea of the ultimatum bargaining game. The 
ultimatum bargaining game is the idea of Guth et al. (1982). In addition to 
Guth, Rabin (1993) helped to pioneer the idea that the best Pareto-
improvement strategy is achieved by including a kindness function 
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incorporated from within the conditional cooperation transaction. What 
Rabin shows is once we allow for reciprocal motivators (eg the social norms 
of willingness to cooperate and choice reciprocity in that A buys if B buys) 
then free riding becomes an unstable equilibrium. According to Rabin and 
Guth's models, prolonged conditional cooperation depends on fairness and 
group benefits.  
Group benefits could come from experiencing group loyalty, instead of 
groups experiencing and acting upon negative endogenous preferences 
through the information that free riding is the best option because others 
are, or shall, free ride. Small groups could focus on group benefits via better 
communication and exchanges of information. The social norm willingness 
to cooperate as a group then supports positive endogenous preferences.  
Positive endogenous preferences are reciprocity choices that have been 
based on other people's choices not to free ride. Therefore, utility increases 
for the whole group. Reciprocity of choice depends on the belief that other 
group members maintain the purchase of low carbon footprint labelled 
products; trust in the group that all group members shall reciprocate that 
trust, and purchase low carbon labelled products (Bicchieri, 2006). In 
addition to the social norm of willingness to cooperate as a group, 
reciprocity of choice is further reinforced by the social norm of loyalty to the 
group in that members would not want their loyalty challenged by other 
group members leading to devaluation of reputation and status in the eyes 
of their peer group. Loyalty would be challenged if some group members did 
not pay back the group in kind (ie I will, if you will). Reciprocity choices are 
imposed through sanctions on non-group conformity; these sanctions help 
to prevent free riding (Teisl, et al., 2007; Allison and Messick, 1990; Fehr 
and Fischbacher, 2004). 
According to further research, there is significant evidence signifying that 
social norms in groups encourage and support cooperation (Bicchieri, 2006 
and Biel, 2000). By keeping groups small, Communications are easier, 
because of the credibility of information and its purpose. Those who do not 
  89 
obey this small group information circle meet with punishment. Kerr (1995) 
found that communication in groups activates a commitment norm. Cialdini 
(2001) revealed that once commitment norms are in place group members 
are more probable to obey and follow them. Orbell et al. (1988) tested the 
claim that commitment norms encourage higher cooperation and found it to 
be true.  
Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit (2006) examined how commitment norms of 
the players in the game influence the players' decisions to cooperate. The 
sample consisted of 84 university students at the University of Auckland. 
Based on ten rounds, each group had students that were randomly selected. 
Each student had 10 tokens. 62% of the university students are conditional 
co-operators. When the level of information was increased to provide 
information on the presence of conditional co-operators, the number of 
students conditionally cooperating increased.  
 
Further evidence of conditional cooperation reciprocity is from Hermann and 
Thoni (2008) who conducted a study involving 160 Russian university 
students. The results found that overall 55.6% were conditional co-
operators. Kocher et al. (2008) tested for conditional cooperation in three 
different countries using university students and found similar results. The 
universities were in the USA, Austria, and Tokyo. 36 university students 
participated in each location, and were divided into groups of 3. 20 tokens 
were given to each student. These students had to make two decisions: one 
unconditional and the other conditional. The study found significant 
evidence for conditional cooperation in all universities. For the USA, 81% 
were categorised as conditional co-operators. In Austria, the figure was 44%. 
In Japan 42% were conditional co-operators.   
 
Field experiments on conditional cooperation reciprocity include Cialdini 
(2008). Cialdini undertook a field conditional cooperation experiment in a 
subway station in New York City. They watched as people left the train and 
made their way out of the Subway. Whilst making their way out of the 
subway, they passed a street musician. The test was to see if they could 
  90 
influence whether a passerby would elect to make a donation. To do this, 
they had an individual make a donation in front of the passersby. The 
experiment found that by seeing this individual make a donation increased 
the probability of making a donation by 8 times, when compared to those 
who did not see this individual make a donation. Donations were also the 
focus of an experiment by Frey and Meier (2004a). The study consisted of 
students choices concerning contributions to two social funds. The results 
found that students were more likely to contribute when other students 
contributed. Information is imperative to the amount contributed to the two 
social funds in that students were more uncertain when the information was 
ambiguous (Frey and Meier, 2004b). Fundraising was the focus of an 
experiment by Shang and Croson (2005). Shang and Croson investigated 
how information on a fundraising campaign broadcasted over public radio 
influenced the amount of the money contributed. The study found that 
social information did increase the size of contributions given to the 
fundraising campaign. Given that donations were broadcast on the radio, 
each choice to contribute is enforceable and is due partly because others 
have chosen to contribute. Vesterlund (2003) found similar results for the 
benefit payoffs of social information. According to research by Vesterlund, 
donations to charitable organisations increase when donators are aware of 
the amount others have donated. Conditional cooperation based on 
verifiable evidence improves contributions. Martin and Randal (2005) found 
that the level of conditional contributions increased in an art gallery when 
the donation box is transparent. Though the admission to the gallery was 
free, one could make a donation into a transparent box. When visitors went 
to view the artwork, they passed the donation box. If the box had donations 
in it, then visitors donated significantly more. Potters et al. (2001) had 
similar results. When the size of the donation was announced, this 
information was used for the next donator. Potters et al. found that 
successive donors maintained the size of the first donor. Heldt (2005) also 
undertook an experiment that required contributions to a cause. The study 
looked at the choice of cross-country skiers in Sweden. The choice was to 
pay, or not, towards a ski track. The results found that cross-country skiers 
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made higher payments when they knew other cross-country skiers were also 
contributing. 
 
Burlando and Guala (2005) focused on how the heterogeneity of preferences 
(ie endogenous preferences in terms of choice reciprocity) supports 
conditional cooperation reciprocity. Based on 4 different games, the highest 
result was for the game that used conditional cooperation. From a sample of 
92 participants, 35% were classified as conditional co-operators. 
Furthermore, Keser and van Winden (2000) also found reciprocity is 
important when contributing to a public account. With a sample size of 160 
participants, the study found that 80% of the sample increased or decreased 
their contribution based on the information of the average group 
contribution. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has showed a detailed analysis of free riding on others in the 
purchase of low carbon footprint labelled products. To do this, a Four-Grid 
Repetitive Payoff Game Matrix (Figure 4, p.73) was constructed. From within 
this theoretical model, the concepts of positive conditional cooperation, 
positive endogenous preferences, negative conditional cooperation and 
negative endogenous preferences were applied to each quadrant framed 
within the research question: 'Can a social preference extension strategy 
help to put off free riders and maintain a Pareto-improvement in the 
Purchase of Low Carbon Information Footprint Labelled Products?'  
 
The central core result from the investigation of the research question is 
that for the removal of free riders from the population, small groups must 
form so that the Pareto-improvement is nurtured from within these small 
groups. To bring about, and to maintain, a Pareto-improvement, the 
research theoretically reasoned that for the Pareto-improvement to be a 
success, this success hinged around focusing on social preferences activated 
from within these small groups. This allows these groups to become more 
open to persuasion and context-dependent in an effort to change preference 
ordering, including the imitation and observation of others within each of 
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these small groups. From this premise, to cooperate is partly determined by 
the reciprocators' authority to punish defectors by exposing them as non-
conformists in their close local community groups.  
The significance of this outcome is that to defect to the Nash dominant 
equilibrium strategy does not necessarily automatically activate if social 
preferences can guide the customers to conform to the Pareto-improvement 
strategy, assuming communication is permitted within these small groups, 
and these groups are of few persons. The empirical evidence on conditional 
cooperation (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2006; Hermann and Thoni, 
2008; Kocher et al., 2008; Cialdini, 2008; Frey and Meier, 2004a; Frey and 
Meier, 2004b; Shang and Croson, 2005; Martin and Randal, 2005; Potters et 
al., 2001; Heldt, 2005; and Burlando and Guala, 2005) suggests that 
individuals do have a willingness to cooperate. The empirical evidence on 
positive conditional cooperation reciprocity in support of the Pareto-
improvement (Figure 4, p.73) does provide grounded evidence that it is 
reasonable to postulate that there would be some communities willing to 
cooperate under a Pareto-improvement and by doing so, maintain the 
Pareto-improvement status, and refrain from free riding on other's efforts.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Conclusion 
 
The research aim of this dissertation was to investigate the effectiveness of 
rational choice theory and to attach a social preference extension strategy to 
rational choice theory in the context of household energy consumption of 
electricity and the purchase of products that have a carbon footprint label. It 
was suggested that using rational choice theory to explain consumer choice 
was a good place to start, for it represents the basic model of consumer 
choice, but falls short in that rational choice theory does not consider 
preferences as context-dependent on the choices of others. This shortfall 
was addressed by using a social preference extension strategy. To build up a 
model that represents the social preference extension strategy, four-research 
questions were proposed. The four-research questions (RQ) proposed were: 
RQ1: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when faced 
with an increase in the price of household electricity? 
 
RQ2: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when exposed 
to information on energy consumption in the household? 
 
RQ3: Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect on 
household energy bill payers' electricity consumption? 
 
RQ4: Can a social preference extension strategy help to put off free riders 
and maintain a Pareto-improvement in the purchase of low carbon 
information footprint labelled products? 
 
The results from RQ1 suggest that household energy bill payers do make 
rational choices when faced with increases in the prices of household 
electricity, however: 
On what premise was it justifiable to state that the household energy bill 
payer does make rational choices? 
 
The premise by which it has proved this lies in the characteristics of 
economic man that represents the household energy bill payer. It was 
discussed that the household energy bill payer has some important, if 
questionably, characteristics. These characteristics include the pursuit to 
satisfy self-interest, having fixed preferences and the desire and want to 
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always utility maximise when presented with a set of choices around which 
complete and perfect information is assumed. For the household energy bill 
payer to utility maximise and follow rational choices, it only requires 
justification that the household energy bill payer seeks to have more over 
less when exposed to the dissemination of the correct and relevant electricity 
price signals. The empirical evidence supports the postulation that the 
household energy bill payer seeks to have more over less (Taylor, 1975; Bohi 
and Zimmerman, 1985; Maddala, et al., 1977; Garcia-Cerratti, 2000 and 
Espey and Espey, 20004). This outcome leads to the first conclusion and the 
first building block to attach the social preference extension strategy to 
rational choice theory. 
Conclusion to research question 1 
RQ1: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when faced 
with an increase in the price of household electricity? Yes, in that, the 
theoretical evidence postulated and the empirical evidence showed that 
household energy bill payers were transitive in choice by preferring more 
savings to fewer saving on electricity consumption. 
 
In addition to electricity price signals, it was further found that information 
could have the ability to alter household electricity consumption by 
informing the household on ways in which to become more household 
energy efficient in the use of electricity in the home. Figure 2 (Chapter 2, 
p.29) demonstrated this with a hypothetical diagram that supports the 
empirical material that depicts the shift from Usage Rate (UR) to Usage 
Rate1 (UR1) (Seligman and Darley, 1977; Winett et al., 1982; Herbrelein and 
Baumgartner, 1985; Haakana et al., 1997; Wilhite, 1997; Brandon and 
Lewis, 1999; McCalley and Midden, 2002 and Mountain, 2006). It was 
suggested that when price signals and energy efficient information are 
combined, these attributes lead to the household energy bill payer reducing 
energy consumption in the home whilst at all times choices exclusively 
remain, and are explained by, the premise under which the rational actor 
calculates choices. Therefore, Conclusion 1 expands to include information 
in the choice process to the order of Conclusion 2 that represents the 
actions of the household energy bill payer: 
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Conclusion to research question 2 
RQ2: Do household energy bill payers make rational choices when exposed 
to information on energy consumption in the household? Yes, in that, the 
theoretical evidence postulated and the empirical evidence showed that 
household energy bill payers do respond to information on electricity savings 
in the home by preferring more savings to fewer saving on electricity 
consumption. 
 
Conclusion 2 is different from Conclusion 1 in that to maximise 
participation in household energy related behaviour requires the combining 
of information along with electricity price signals. Conclusion 2 is supported 
by the empirical studies both on the sensitivity of the supply of electricity 
(Chapter 2, pp. 24-26) and information regarding ways in which households 
can become more household energy efficient (Chapter 2, pp. 28-35). 
However, although the result of Conclusion 2 is important in that rational 
behaviour is able to influence environmental household related behaviour, 
the research further found that this conclusion is only part of the complete 
story. Conclusion 2 sits on the premise that preferences are exogenous and 
do not change. Figure 1 (Chapter 2, p.21) took the stance of unchanging 
preferences by showing that individualistic choices view all other social 
phenomena as 'not relevant' to the explanation of choice, and focus only on 
the ways in which to get the price right by using electricity price signals and 
environmental efficiency information. However, this assumption of non-
relevance is a significant limitation and completely dismisses the idea that 
preferences are often endogenous and that preferences are affected by social 
phenomena such peer pressure and social norms (Chapter 3, Figure B in 
Figure 3, p.50).  
 
Furthermore, Conclusion 2 provides no explanation for experiments that 
suggest that the participation in environmental related behaviour is further 
enhanced by the influence from social preferences (Duesenberry, 1949; 
Leibenstein, 1950; Lichtenstein and Slovic, 1971; Loomes and Sudgen, 
1982; Davis and Holt, 1993; Bereby-Meyer and Erev, 1998; Loomes, 1998, 
1999; Benabou and Tirole, 2002; Bowles, 2004 and Akerlof and Kranton, 
2005). The research at this point introduced Social Man. The characteristics 
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of social man were explained in Loomes's (1999) experiment (Chapter 3, 
Table 1, p.41) where we found support for expanding even further 
Conclusion 2. Loomes's choice experiment adds to the evidences that 
household energy bill payers are willing to accept behaviour and change 
choices to achieve or sacrifice possible gains depending on whether 
household energy bill payers feel they have been dealt an unfair hand. 
Loomes's experiment is instrumental in helping to manipulate Conclusion 2 
in that the research proved that social preferences are used to make 
preferences malleable and depend on persuasion and context-manipulation 
including the observation and imitation of other's choices in relation to 
environmental related behaviour. Therefore, Conclusion 2 expands to 
include social preferences as an extension strategy in the choice process to 
the order of Conclusion 3 that represents the combination of economic man 
and social man to explain the decisions of Social-Economic Man that 
represents the household energy bill payer: 
Conclusion to research question 3 
RQ3: Does a social preference extension strategy have an effect on 
household energy bill payers' electricity consumption? Yes, in that, the 
logical conditions of rationality (ie transitivity and completeness) also apply 
to social preferences in that Social-Economic Man divides this rationality 
into more money savings are preferred to less money savings and wanting to 
conform to others is preferred to not wanting to conform to others. When 
these characteristics were combined, household energy consumption did 
decrease. 
 
Social-Economic Man represents Conclusion 3. It is the evidence that for the 
best approach for manipulating environmental related behaviour, 
policymakers must appeal to the characteristics of economic man and the 
characteristics of social man to maximise the chance of influencing 
environmental related behaviour. The importance of this conclusion is that 
it incorporates the social preference extension strategy. The social 
preference extension strategy represents the times when choices become 
context-dependent on the choices of other household energy bill payers. The 
empirical research provided the evidence that environmental related 
behaviour from individuals provides cooperation between these individuals 
when they become exposed to social norms and peer pressure (Thaler and 
  97 
Sunstein, 2008; Schultz, et al., 2007; Cialdini, 2007; Pallak, et al., 1980; 
Allcott, 2009 and Ayers, et al., 2009).    
 
Finally, the presents of the social preference extension strategy attached to 
rational choice theory proved how social preferences manipulate choices 
when framed in a hypothetical Four-Grid Repetitive Game Payoff Matrix 
(Chapter 4, Figure 4, p.73). The results from this game provided two 
important findings in the context of research question 4. 
Conclusion to research question 4 
Can a social preference extension strategy help to put off free riders and 
maintain a Pareto-improvement in the purchase of low carbon information 
footprint labelled products? 
 
1. No, if in large groups, in that, the thought of free riders triggers 
defection in the purchase of carbon footprint labelled products. This is 
because strong negative conditional cooperation and strong influences 
from negative endogenous preferences leads both customers to free 
ride in that Customer 1 anticipates Customer 2 shall defect, thereby 
triggering Customer 2 to defect in the purchase of products that have 
carbon footprint information. 
2.  Yes, if in small groups, in that to remove the free rider problem it was 
suggested that peer pressure and social norms are used and targeted 
at small local community groups. By targeting small local community 
groups, it allows for the creation of strong positive conditional 
cooperation and strong influences from positive endogenous 
preferences. Because, by having small local community groups, it 
provides the opportunity to punish those in the group who violate the 
social norm of wanting to cooperate with the group and not to free ride 
on the expensive of the groups’ efforts. This risk of punishment from 
other members of the small group helps to maintain a Pareto-
improvement and encourages free riders not to defect to the dominant 
Nash equilibrium option.  
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Final thoughts 
Overall, taking the wider picture, the conclusion of this dissertation is that 
rational choice theory remains a strong theory to explain consumer choices, 
but requires modernising. This modernisation comes in the form of a social 
preference extension strategy that attaches itself to rational choice theory. 
By attaching the social preference extension strategy to rational choice 
theory, it has added another dimension to rational choice theory.  
 
This dimension has major implications for policymakers, because it means 
that household energy bill payers and consumers purchasing low carbon 
footprint labelled products can no longer be taken as the immovable judges 
of their best interest. The social preference extension strategy creates 
options where policymakers rely on persuasion and context-manipulation to 
change preference orderings, rather than using policies that rely exclusively 
on sticks and carrots with given preferences. This particular social 
preference extension strategy explored in this dissertation takes into 
account the possibility that preferences are malleable and depend on the 
observation and imitation of others when in small groups.  
 
Though the research has focused on environmental related behaviour, the 
social preference extension strategy is applicable to any type of consumer 
choice decision that allows group dynamics to create context-dependent 
consumer choices, instead of relying on individualistic choices with given 
preferences.   
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